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The St. Lawrence seaway poses a fascinating problem to lay-
man and scholar alike, for it is the substance of a proposed national
policy which has been periodically reintroduced as a subject of dis-
cussion in the Congress and of investigation by the executive branch
of the federal government — yet more than fifty years of speculation,
discussion and investigation have resulted in no positive action on
the project as a wholel It comprises a dynamic issue centered
around a dramatic possibility for waterway and hydroelectric power
development and is compounded of articulate sectional and economic
interests as v/ell as heated disputation over basic facts; international
in scope, it also embraces a federal-state relationship with regard
to the American power project envisaged by the plans. Reduced to
concise terms, the St. Lawrence seaway project is the proposed plan
for developing a water route available to ocean shipping from the
Gulf of St. Lawrence, which opens on the Atlantic Ocean, to Duluth,
Minnesota, which is the western-most terminal of Lake Superior, com-
bined with plans for a huge electric-power development in the Inter-
national Rapids section of the river.
The St. Lawrenc^ seaway project may perhaps be studied most
fruitfully if it is approached with objectivity ana treated as a means,
not an end in itself — a means to a better understanding of the
dynamics of policy-formation in general. This "problem child" of
American politics, while fascinating in its ov/n right and for its own
sake, may prove moat worthwhile as a subject for reaearch if our in-
quiry is not limited to an investigation merely of its merits and
shortcomings per se. Ihe larger significance of the proposed seaway
lies, not in the substance of the project itself, but in the prolonged
controversy surrounding it — a controversy initiated at the levels

where public opinion ta.±ea shape and reaching full fruition in
the assemblages where public policy is formed. An analysis of the
recent controversies in Congress over the St. Lawrence seaway pro-
ject, predicated upon certain basic observations about the relation-
ship between public opinion and public policy, should reveal impor-
tant reasons for confused public thinking and for inadequacies in
the mechanics of policy formation in general.
It is the purpose of this study to prove the value of the em-
pirical approach, the indispendability of expert knowledge and inter-
pretation of the facts in the technique of policy-making. Our
hypothesis may be summed up as follov/s : the proposed St. Lawrence
seaway project is typical of those complicated problems of public
policy which not only test our highest capacities for deductive
reasoning but also require an empirical approach which the average
citizen, even the average lawmaker, is incapable of achieving under
present-day conditions. This case study embraces historical and
geographical descriptive material as well as the use of such primary
sources as government publicatio...s and documents, and it spotlights
the public hearinrs held by subcommittees of the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations in the 79th and 80th Congresses, on Senate
Joint Resolutions 104 and 111, respectively.
The St. Lawrence seaway, as currently conceived, would cover
a mileage measured in the thousands, and in addition to new canals,
dredging, deepening of channels and other improvements, it would re-
quire the construction of two large dams, powerhouses and 8 new locks.
But a completed St. Lawrence seaway is not a new concept, and a large
share of its significance stems from this very fact. For more than
one hundred years proposals have been advanced concer/ning it; it
boasts a long history in the dreams of man, in the investigations j^of
cc
special commissions, and in the debates of legislative bodies. Up
to the present time, proponents of the project have resorted to
two types of procedure, neither of which has spelled success: a
formal treaty with Canada, requiring ratification by a two-thirds
vote of the Senate, and the legislative agreement method, whereby
the two houses of Congress put their stamp of approval upon an exec-
utive agreement with Canada by simple majority vote. The latter
type of procedure provides the framework for the recent controversies
in the 79th and 80th Congresses; both Senate Joint Resolution 104
and Senate »Joint Re^utlon 111 were designed to bring into operation
the executive agreement between the United States and Canada signed
March 19, 1941, which provided in detail for the construction of
the seaway project and which, in turn, was linked to an existing
earlier treaty between the two countries, the Boundary Waters Treaty
of 1909. By its own terms, the Agreement of 1941 required ratifica-
tion by a majority vote of both the United States Congress and the
Canadian ^arliement, and it has never been so ratified.
In almost every question of public Importance, procedural
difficulties are apt to arise. It is commonly recognized by those
associated with the seaway moi?ement that one of the great stumbling
blocks to the success of the campaign is the question of legislative
procedure. In the case of Senate Joint Resolution 104, known as the
Earkley Resolution, ,^$roin bloc of senators stood rea^^y to oppose
its passage on the ground that the resolution dealt with a subject
which should be dealt with by a formal treaty only, subject to a
two-thirds vote of approval in the Senate. A potent factor in the
disagreement over procedure is the apparent determination of a major-
ity of senators to protect their constitutional authority to par-
ticipate in the making of treaties. The whole procedural question
e
is of a highly technical and legalistic nature and requires for its
understanding a knowledge of the concepts involved in the terms,
"treaty", "executive agreement", and "legislative agreement". The
problem of legislative action on the seaway issue raises questions
of a fundamental nature relating to the basic structure, function
and workings of the legislative branch of our government.
Turning to a consideration of the substantive aspects of
the seaway project, one is faced with a mass of conflicting facts
and opinions at every point. Since the project is a two-fold one,
involving both navigation improvement and electric-power-producing
facilities, and since the hearings embrace all aspects of the project
without any logical organization except for a clear-cut differentiation
between self-styled proponents and opponents, the arguments on all
points are intermingled freely. It is well to remember that an in-
dividual or group desirous of defeating the seaway project need only
attack one of the two primary aspects; since the project must be
proved feasible in both respects, it is vulnerable to attack on
both fronts.
The arguments on the Barkley Resolution hinge on the follow-
ing chief topics: the costs involved, the economic benefit or harm
which the seaway would bring, the short season and the general navi-
gation conditions on the river and in the lakes, the practicability
of the 27-foot channel depths proposed, the ships that could be ex-
pected to use the seaway, and the hydroelectric power aspects of
the project, with emphasis upon the federal-state accord between
New ^ork State and the Federal Government. The arguments on Senate
Joint Resolution 111, known as the Vandenburg Resolution, hinge on
two main subjects: the value of the seaway to the national defense
in the atomic age, and the feasibility of self-3tiquidation of the
1
seaway "by means of tolls on cargo. The mere enumeration of these
points, which by no means exhaust the total subjects for debate,
attests to the complicated nature of the project and the magnitude
of its ramifications; in connection with many of the debatable points,
the basic facts are in dispute as well as the interpretations of the
facts
.
Furthermore, a decision one v/ay or the other on the merits
of the project requires not merely an understanding of the real facts,
which themselves are confused, but a comprehension of the relevant
facts. Even a superficial analysis of the hearings reveals that in
some ^^i<^i respects the proponents have failed to discover the im-
portance of relevancy ;;: they have freely mingled valid arguments with
specious ones. Cn the other hand,,, the opponents fight on two fronts
and maintain a basically inconsistent position: : saying in one breath
that the St. Lawrence seaway would be a failure as a navigational
project, they contend in the next that a auccessful St. Lawrence sea-
way would be highly injurious to many established ports and industries.
While this double-barreled approach might be a good defensive tactic
in a court of law, and is not to be condemned at the hearings, its
use in the chambers of Congress throws suspicion upon the real con-
victions and motives of legislators meditating upon the wisdom of a
proposed national policy.
The Barkley Resolution, reported to the Senate with the recommenda
tion of the Committee on Foreign Rel?.tions, v/as placed on the Senate
calendar but was not reached before Lhe 79th Congress adjourned sine
die in August, 1946. The Yandenburg Resolilitlon, on the other hand,
also reported with the recommendation of the Committee on Foreign
Relations, was recommitted to that committee for further study after a
ijpote on the Senate floor on a motion introduced by Senator Smith of
rc
New Jersey. As much a victory for the opponents as if the bill
had been killed outright, the tactic of reconmiittal served, however,
to focus attention upon the essential core of the problem inherent
in the seaway controversy.
V/e may well speculate upon the possibility that recoGinittal
of the Vandenburg Resolution represented a Senatorial protest against
the herculean task of digging for information which should have been
available in form suitable for decision . v7hile the record of
the hearings on the seaway project totals 1986 pages of detailed
arguments, opinion, facts and psuedo-facts , that record hardly can be
described as information arranged and developed in a form suitable
for decision. The detailed arguments frequently contradict one another,
the opinions presented are often so charged with emotionalism that
their value is quest ionaXtil?* the facts and psuedo-facts are inter-
mingled in such a way that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish
between them. Furthermore, the relevance of facts admittedly true is
immensely difficult to determine. It can truly be said that the highest
capacities for deductive reasoning possessed by attentive Senators
of the 80th Congress were sorely tried b^ the confused, complex and
contradictory testimony contained in the hearings on the seaway reso-
lution. .
Detailed and presumably objective studies undertaken by govern-
ment agencies were contradicted and repudiated by witness ariad after
witness at the hearings, suggesting the basic conflict between the
practice of free and open policy-making on the one hand, and the criteri'
of Expertise on the other. The term "expert" is subject to much use,
misuse and abuse during the course of the hearings, and this is per-
haps the greatest single factor contributing to the confusion of the
record. Furthermore, the organization of the hearings itself leaves

much to be desired. The customary procedure in conducting hearings
before legislative subcommittees was followed in this case: a
specif/;z^ied number of days were set aside for the hearings, the
time being equally divided between the opponents and proponents.
While the fairness of this arrangement cannot be criticized, the con-
fusion resulting from this arrangement is shocking: longwinded repeti-
tion and rambling emotionalizm characterize the hearings, and im-
portant arguments are frequently sub^>erged or completely lost in the
shuffle. Logic would dictate a more straightforward and direct
approach to technical and legalistic matters, a greater insistence
upon objective qualifications for "experts", a greater respect for
true expertise. And common sense would recommend a greater regard
for brief, relevant testimony.
Finally, the role which lobbies and pressure groups played at
the public hearings on the two resolutions should not be overlooked
or underestimated. While a study of pressure groups per se lies
outside the scope of our study, it is not unfair to conclude that
important and powerful pressure groups were busily at work on behalf
of and in opposition to the seaway project and that their work often
served to confuse as well as to cl«^fy the pertinent issues.
The controversy over the St. Lawrence seaway project teaBhes
a precious lesson: there can be no substitute, under present-day
conditions, for really expert knowledge and interpretation of the
facts. The value of the empirical approach is great, but that approach
is one to which, in the complicated world of today, we dare not aspire;
all the elements of modern life cxanspire against it. The complexity
of modern life has led to tae compartmentalization of knowledge,
and that, in turn, requires adjustments in the organization of govern-
ment. The public hearing must be augmented by other devices for the
r(
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securing of vital information on which to predicate inteiiigent
action; we must find a way to cope more effectively v/ith the vast
environment that is beyond the reach of the average citizen and the
average lawmaker, without destroying the vital structure v/hich makes
possible the translation of public opinion into public policy. We
ffluct somehow develop a vigorous concept of expertise and a workable,
dependable, democratically-controlled system of fact-finding and fact-
interpretation, in order that public opinion may result in valid
social Judgmenta and political action may culminate in sound public
policy.
Ce
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INTRODUCTION
The St, La^vrence seaway poses a fascinating problem to layman and
scholar alike, for it is the substance of a proposed national policy which
has been periodically reintroduced as a subject of discussion in the Congre
and of investigation by the executive branch of the federal government —
yet more than fifty years of speculation, discussion and investigation have
resulted in no positive action on the project as a whole I It comprises a
dynamic issue centered around a dramatic possibility for waterway and
hydroelectric power development and is compounded of articulate sectionsQ.
and economic interests as well as heated disputation over basic facts;
international in scope, it also embraces a federal-state relationship with
regard to the American power project envisaged by the plans. Reduced to
concise terms, the St, Lawrence seaway project is the proposed plan for
developing a water route available to ocean shipping from the Gulf of St,
Lawrence, which opens on the Atlantic Ocean, to Duluth, Minnesota, which
is the western-most terminal of Lake Superior, combined with plans for a
huge electric-power development in the International Rapids section of the
river,
E, Pendleton Herring has written, "At the verj'- basis of orthadox
democratic dogma lies the concept of rule by public opinion,"-^ and his
statement is not likely to be contravened. The theory that public policy
•^E, Pendleton Herring, Group Representation Before Congress
(institute for Governmental Research of the Brookings Institution, Balti-
more: Johns Hopkins Press, 1929), p.l.

ii
is the culmination of public opinion is widely accepted^ however, this
theory, while valid in one sense, is actually a misleading oversimplification
of the matter. Although public policy does not flourish in a vacuum and
cannot be divorced from public opinion, public policy is more often the
culmination (or the compromise) of several public opinions. Modem studies
by political scientists indicate that what we loosely refer to as "the
public" is in reality a number of "publics"j a public is simply any collec-
tion of individuals, and there are many kinds of publics. Opinion is merely
a crystallization of attitude, and attitude may be defined as "the sum
total of a man*s inclinations and feelings, prejudice or bias, preconceived
notions, ideas, fears, threats and convictions about any specific topic, "^
Public opinion, then, is "any collection of individual opinions, regardless
of the degree of agreement or uniformity"^; "the degree of uniformity is
a matter to be investigated, not something to be arbitrarily set up as a
condition for the existence of public opinion,"^
And how may the degree of uniformity of individual opinions be
investigated, what are the possible indices of public opinion? The method
which James Bryce long ago suggested, to talk with and observe the reactions
of all kinds and classes of men, is patently inadequate; the press is a
possible index, but since newspapers serve not only to reflect but to
actively influence and shape public opinion, they are likely to be inaccurate
L. L, Thurstone and E, J, Chave, The Measurement of Attitude
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929), pp. 6,7, quoted by Harwood
L, Childs in ^ Introduction to Public Opinion (New York: John Wiley and
Sons, Inc. 5 London: Chapman and Hall, Ltd,, 191;0), p, h3»
3childs, ibi4
., p. US.
^Loc, cit.
c
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as measuring devices. The "scientific" public opinion poll, based upon
sampling techniques, has only recentl^r fallen into disrepute, as a result
of blunders in pre-election predictions in the autumn of 19U8, The diffi-
culty of measuring public opinion is only one of the problems which our
theory poses j what is the quality of public opinion apt to be, assuming that
it is measurable? An individual affirmative or negative opinion can be wise
or unwise, depending upon the reasoning behind itj the reasoning can be
adequate or inadequate, dependj.ng upon the facts available for cogitation
and upon the individual's mental equipment and approach to the facts. Our
definition of attitude, which is the core of opinion, has given coverage to
such irrational factors as prejudice and preconceived notions^ how great
a part do these factors play in public opinion?
The translation of public opinion into public policy involves
further complications. For public policy almost invariably implies a pro-
gram, and a program requires leadership, Walter Lippman has pointed out
that
Programs do not invent themselves synchronously in a multitude
of minds,.,not because a multitude of minds is necessarily inferior
to that of the leaders, but because thought is the function of an
organism, and a mass is not an organisms
The group as a whole serves to assent to or dissent from the
program or policy as presented by its leaders^ hence, the manufacture of
consent becomes a highly important activity. We see the fine art of per-
suasion practiced in the interests of certain organized publics whenever
a lobby or pressure group swings into action. The rise of pressure groups
signifies a noteworthy development in representative government: superim-
posed upon our legailly established governmental system based upon geographic
^•^'aJLter Lippman, Public Opinion (New York: Harcourt, Brace and
Co., 1922), p. 2U3.
fi
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representation is a new system of vocational and special-interest repre-
sentation, extra-legal but highly effective in practice. Pressure groups
profess to represent certain segments of the population in regard to certain
policy matters; as a measuring stick for public opinion, however, the
pressure group falls far short of accuracy, due to the undefined scope
of its membership and the usually unclear delegation of authority by the
membership to its legislative agents. The sheer number and variety of
existing organizations vvhich may conceivably concentrate their energies
at a given time on a given policy matter staggers the imagination — and
must occasionally overwhelm the earnest legislator desirous of giving all
sides a fair hearing.
Today as in the past, the function of the United States Congress
is to provide policy leadership: to ascertain and reflect public opinion
in the process of deliberating upon courses of action, and ultimately, to
fashion public policy in the form of legislation. It is in the Congress
that all the problems heretofore mentioned converge, in all their ramifica-
tions, upon the target of specific subject matter — subject matter frequently
so complex and technical in nature that to comprehend it and act intelli-
gently upon it would try the ability of a corps of experts! Is it likely
that self-centered opinions tinged with irrationalism can be filtered
through a sorely taxed and confused legislature composed of representatives
not especially chosen for their expertise — and emerge as sound public
policy? This is a question we may well ponder,
j
Mr. 'kTalter Lippman in his remarkable study, "Public Opinion", has
advanced several explanations for confused public thinking and for certain
inadequacies in our democratic system. He maintains that the theory of the
I1
"self-sufficient individual", basic to our concept of democratic
government, falls down because none of us actually is self-sufficient
in the modern world, Our environment is too wide, too complex, too
immense to admit of direct access to the facts of many different
situations on the part of the average individual, even of the average
lawmsJcer, Indeed, Lippman says that the main reason for the discredit
of Congress is that
A Congress of representatives is essentially a group of
blind men in a vast, unknown ¥rorld,,,a combination of local
impressions is not a wide enough base for national policy?
Extending ¥r, Lippman *s view, it is this writer's opinion that
the much-vaunted "town meeting" type of discussion and exchange, held
in such high regard over the years as a molder of informed public opinion,
is not a wide enough base for public opinion on large issues; the "town
meeting" is conducive to purely deductive reasoning, and deductive analysis
alone is insufficient. Mere discussion and argument guarantee us no knowledge
of the facts
.
Furthermore, on complicated problems of a technical nature
(like the St, Lawrence seaway project), even our highest capacities for
deductive reasoning are sorely tried, Te hear everywhere the catch-phrases,
"Be informed!" "Have a public opinion of your own!" "Know the facts! ",
yet many of the problems of our day defy easy definition, let alone clear
understanding. It is interesting to note in this connection that the
well-known radio program, "America's Town Meeting of the Air", which is
illustrative of this approach to political problems and public opinion
"Ibid
,, p. 27U.
'^
Ibid ,, p. 288,
1c
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and which encourages individuals to take sides on public issues, last year
devoted one of its hours on the air to a pro-and-con discussion of the St,
Lawrence seaway, which represents one of the knottiest problems of recent
years.
^
The value of the empirical approach, the indispensability of expert
knovrledge and interpretation of the facts are largely overlooked at the
levels where public opinion takes shape and in the assemblages where public
policy is formed. It is the purpose of this study to prove their importance.
The hypothesis of this paper may be summed up as follows: the proposed
St, Lawrence seaway project is typical of those complicated problems of
public policy which not only test oiu^ highest capacities for deductive
reasoning but also require an empirical approach which the average citizen,
even the average lawmalcer, is incapable of achieving under present-day
conditions. The task at hand requires an analysis of recent controversies
in Congress over the seaway project, using the records of the legislative
hearings as a touchstone to an understanding of the proponents and
opponents and of the arguments pro and con, . Emphasis will be placed
upon the tactics and techniques employed as well as upon the substance of
the arguments, and attention will be paid to internal inconsistencies and
departures from logic in the arguments. This case study of the St,
Lawrence seaway project embraces historical and geographical descriptive
material as well as an analysis of the contending forces and conflicting
points of viewj it includes the use of such primary sources as the printed
hearings of legislative subcommittees, the Congressional Record, and other
government publications and documents, '/Thile the writer cannot herself
''"..'iTiierica's Town Meeting of the Air," broadcast by stations of
the American Broadcasting Company, February 2h, 19U8,
c
hope to utilize the empirical approach which she recommends, she can
attempt to show the existing pattern of fact and opinion on the seaway
and to evaluate that pattern in terms of her hypothesis. The ultimate
conclusions, it is modestly believed, cannot help but shed light upon
forces and factors influencing the formation of American public policy.
r
CHAPTER I
THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PROPOSED SEAWAY PROJECT
The St, Lawrence seaway is not a new project, and a large
share of its significance stems from this very fact. It boasts a long
history in the dreams of man, in the investigations of special commis-
sions, and in the debates of legislative bodies; for more than one hiindred
years proposals have been advanced concerning it, "i/hile it has been
viewed by its proponents throughout this period prim-arily as a project
to improve navigation, the possibilities of developing hydroelectric
power in conjunction vdth facilitating navigation have been given consid-
erable attention in recent years.
In order to understand the ramifications of the project, it is
necessary to scrutinize the geography of a considerable portion of the
North American Continent, The great central plain of the North American
continent has three natural entrances, all involving river basins. These
river basins are the Mississippi River Basin, the Hudson-Mohawk Valley,
and the St, Lawrence River and the Great Lakes, '."/hile the St, Lawrence
Plver proper rises in Lalce Ontario, its ultimate source is at the head
of the St, Louis River, at the extreme end of Lake Superior, 1,870 miles
from the Gulf of St, Lawrence,-^ The river lies within a great transverse
Message of the President of the United States, transmitting
a letter from the Secretary of State submitting the Report of the Interna-
tional Joint Commission concerning the im.provement of the St, La'Arrence River
between Montreal and Lake Ontario for navigation and power, in Sen .
Doc , llU, 67th Congress, 2nd Sess. (Washington, D.C,: United States
Government Printing Office, 1922), p. l5.

2valley 309,500 square miles in area, extending from the Gulf into the
heart of the continent. The Great Lakes themselves have been viewed as
"expansions" of the course of the St, Lawrence River. Lake Superior
empties through St. Mary*s River into Lake Huron and Lake Michigan,
These discharge through the St. Clair River and Lake St. Clair by way
of the Detroit River into Lake Erie, Lake Erie, in turn, is separated
from Lake Ontario by the Niagara River and the Falls, In the St, Lawrence
proper, below Laike Ontario, are three minor "expansions": Lake St, Francis,
Lake St, Louis and Lake St. Peter, Between Lake Superior and the Gulf is
a total fall of 603 feet,^
Lake Superior, the largest of the Great Lakes, is 383 miles long,
averages 80 miles in width and has an area of 31,800 square miles. Lake
Huron is 223 miles long, with an average breadth of 100 miles and an area
of 23,200 square miles. Lake Michigan is 321 miles long, with an average
breadth of 58 miles, and it covers 22,U50 square miles. Lake St. Clair
is 26 miles long, with an average width of 20 miles and an area of hh$
square miles. Lake Erie is 236 miles long, with an average width of
38 miles and an area of 9,9UO square miles. Lake Ontario is 190 miles
long, Ydth an average width of UO miles and covers 7,260 square miles.
The mean and maximum depths of the various lakes are as follows: Superior,
U75 and 1,012 feet; Huron, 2^0 and 7^0 feet; Michigan, 325 and 87O feet;
Erie, 70 and 210 feet; Ontario, 300 and 738 feet.^
^Sen. Doc . llU, loc . cit,
3loc , cit.
Frank Keyser, "The St. Lawrence Seaway Project," Public Affairs
Bulletin No. 58^ (Washington, D.C.: The Legislative Reference Service of the
Library of Congress, July, 19U7), p, 2,
f
3Below Lake Ontario, the St, Lawrence varies in width between one and
three miles as far down as the city of Quebec, From there on, to the Gulf
itself, it broadens considerably. Between Lake Ontario and Cornwall are
three rapids (Galops, the Rapide Plat and the Long Sault), while between
Lake St, Francis and Lake St, Louis lie three more (the Goteau, Cedars and
Cascades.) The last rapids in the river are the Lachine and the St, Mary
current at Montreal,^
The St. Lawrence seaway project as it is understood today would
undertaJce to remove certain obstacles which now prevent deep-draft shipping
from moving between the Great Lakes and the Atlantic Ocean over the course
outlined above, as well as to construct various power facilities along the
way. Engineering plans to accomplish these objectives have been worked out
by the Corps of Engineers of the United States Array, working in conjunction
with engineers of the Canadian Government;^ definite data was developed
by the St, Lawrence River District of the Corps during the period beginning
November U, 19kO through May 1, 19U2, and a total sum of $1,3^0,000 was
expended by the United States for these on-the-spot-investigations and
drawing up of blueprints.*^ By referring to the map in the Appendix, and
imagining the journey of a ship leaving port at Duluth on Lake Superior,
the physical aspects of the project become clearer. After sailing eastwai^i
across Lake Superior, our ship would arrive at the St, Mary's River, which
^Keyser, loc , cit ,
^ Majority Report of a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations on S. J, Res, 111, Sen, Report 810, 80th Congress, 2nd Sess, (Wash-
ington, D,C,: United States Government Printing Office, 19U8)j P« U3,
"^Ibid,, p, U6
c
kdivides Michigan from Ontario and also joins Lakes Superior and Huron,
Here at Sault St. Marie, Michigan, our vessel passes through the MacArthur
Lock, coii5)leted in 19U3 by the United States as a war emergency measure,
and continues along the St. Mary's River to Lake Huron.
^
Proceeding south to the lower end of Lake Huron, we encounter
next the St. Clair and Detroit Rivers, which form the boundaries between '
Ontario and southern Michigan, Traversing the UO-mile St, Clair River,
we cross Lake St, Clair and enter the Detroit River; we pass Detroit and
emerge at the western end of Lake Erie, Shipping channels in the three
connecting rivers we have already passed are now 25 feet deep; the United
States would increase the depth of them all to 2? feet and undertake a
similar deepening of Lake St, Clair and of Mackinac channels (where LaJce
Michigan joins with Lakes Superior and Huron) ,9
Continuing the journey down Lake Erie, we cut off through the
Welland Canal in order to by-pass the Niagara River and Niagara Falls,
This canal, built in Ontario by Canada, is 28 miles long and consists of
8 locks to overcome the 32l4.-foot difference in the levels of Lake Erie and
Lake Ontario,10 The canal at present is 2^ feet deep and would be deepened
by Canada to 2? feet. At the north end of the canal, we emerge upon Lake
Ontario and proceed eastward to the St. Lawrence River, at which point
we would be forced to conclude our journey unless we were traveling in a
Q"The Recent Battle in Congress over the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence
Seaway Project", The Congressional Digest , 2^:10:227, October, 19h6,
^Loc , cit,
Loc, cit.

5vessel with a draft of less than lU feet. The reason is that from here
to Montreal there is only a lU-foot navigational channel, which has been
maintained by Canada on her side of the river for some time.
The first 68 miles of the St. Lawrence, known as the Thousand
Islands section, have already been improved by the United States and Canada
acting jointlyj but further improvement would be made by the United States
and the channel deepened to 27 feet under the detailed plans for seaway
construction. The next U6 miles of the St. Lawrence, from Ogdensburg, New
York to St. Regis, New York, is the International Rapids section. Here the
United States, if the seaway were undertaken, would install the necessary
27-foot canals and locks to permit navigation. A control dam to maintain
the level of Lake Ontario would be built by the United States about ^ miles
east of Ogdensburg at Iroquois Point. Fifteen miles further along, near
Massena, New York, a large power dam would cross the river. Canada would
install the power machinery in her half of the power station. Total capacity
of this power project would be 2,200,000 horsepower, the power to be shared
equally by the two countries.
Beyond the site of the Massena Dam is the lower rapids section, lying
wholly within Canadian territory, a stretch of almost 70 miles between St,
Regis, New York and Montreal, where canals and channels would be built or
improved by Canada as part of the project. This work involves dredging of
Lake St. Francis, improving the existing So\ilanges Canal, constricting twin
locks near the Beauharnois powerhouse and a nev; Lachine Canal connecting
Lake St. Louis with the harbor of Montreal. From Montreal to the Gulf of
St. Lawrence the river is 7d.de and the channel is 35 feet deep; no in5)rove-
ment of this section is anticipated.
A
6This is the way the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence seaway, as ctirrently
conceived, would look if approved and constructed. It would cover a mileage
measured in the thousands, and in addition to the new canals, dredging,
deepening of channels and other improvements, it would require the con-
struction of two large dams, powerhouses and 8 new locks. -^-^
-'-'•The Congressional Digest, loc. cit, (Note: all facts given in the
last five paragraphs which relate to physical developments envisaged by
official plans for the St. Lawrence seaway project are culled from this
source
.
)
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CHAPTER II
THE HISTORY OF THE MOVEMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT
OF THE ST. LA^mENCE SEAWAY
Despite the recent interest in the seaway project and the
extensive studies undertaken in late years, both in the field of
practical planning and in the realm of theory and prediction of the
seaway's utility, proposals for a navigable waterway upon the St» Lavyrence
are not of recent oidgin. In all likelihood, the fact that the major part
of the St. Lawrence River lies within Canadian borders provides the
reason for early Canadian agitation for improvement of the waterway; as
early as 1825, the Honorable John Young of Montreal, together with other
citizens, spoke in behalf of a policy of improvement.-^ In 1832, in an
essay by A# Projector entitled, "A Concise View of Inland Navigation of the
Canadian Provinces...", it was urged that a ship canal rendering the upper
Lake ports accessible to the sea would insure prosperity. ^ By this time
a sizeable fleet of vessels wsls navigating the Great Lakes, and a widely
desired aim was to facilitate grain movements down the Lakes to Montreal
without transshipment. It was apparently also clear that, by developing
natural waterways and building supplementary canals, import costs could
be cut and access to American markets obtained.
-••C. Frank Keyser, "The St. Lawrence Seaway Project," Public Affairs
Bulletin No, ^ (Washington, D.C: The Legislative Reference Service of the
Library of Congress, July, 19U7), p« 3.
The St. Lawrence Survey
,
prepared under the auspices of the United
States Department of Commerce (Washington, D.C: United States Government
Printing Office, 19Ul), Part I, p.l, quoted in loc . cit.

8The improvement of ship channels and the construction of
canails proceeded throughout the centuiy; work on the Lachine Canal
was completed in l82^, the Cornwall Canal in 18U3* the Beauhamois
Canal in 18U8 and the Williamsburg Canals in 18U7.^ The original Welland
Canal, connecting Lakes Ontario and Erie, was completed in 1829, more than
a century before its modern successor, widened and deepened in line with
modem seaway speculations, was opened to traffic.^ Meanwhile, the ship
channel between Montreal and Quebec was being gradually deepened, until
by 1899 depths of 30 feet had been obtained.^ The gradual development
of the St, Lawrence Basin, undertaken during the 19th and early 20th
centuries, ultimately confined the St. Lawrence Seaway project, geograph-
ically^ to the area between the foot of Lake Ontario (more accurately,
the river opposite Prescott, Ontario) and Montreal; the distance from
Prescott to Montreal is 119.10 miles, hO% of this distance being through
canals.^
Vigorous modem demands for the construction of deep waterway
communication between the Lakes and the Atlantic arose in the early
1890 's. In 1895 the governments of the United States and Canada
appointed a Deep Vfeterways Commission, which, two years later, after
careful study, reported that the St, Lawrence route was feasible and
3sen, Doc , llU , 67th Cong,, 2nd Sess, (Washington, D,C,:
United States Government Printing Office, 1922), p. 17,
^April 6, 1932.
^Keyser, 0£. cit, , pp,3-l4.
^Ibid., p, U.
cI
9recommended that further detailed surveys be made.*^ Under the
Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, the two governments established the
International Joint Commission to review proposals for the construc-
tion of obstructions in and diversions of boundary waters, giving
preference to the uses of such waters for domestic and sanitary
purposes, for navigation and servicing of canals, and for power and
irrigation purposes, in that order
In 1919, as a result of congressional authorization, the
International Joint Commission undertook a most extensive investigation
of the feasibility of the St. Lawrence seaway project. Hesirings were
held in many cities throughout the United States and Canad.aj the
record of these hearings covers 60 volumes.^ In 1921 the Commission
rendered a unanimous report favoring early undertaking of the navigation
project. In the same year, a Joint Engineering Board, vdiich had been
established in connection with the International Joint Commission's study,
reported to the Commission that physical conditions were favorable for
undertaking permanent navigational improvements on the St. Lawrence.
These favorable reports were shortly followed by others: that
of the United States-St. Lawrence Commission, headed by Secretary of
Commerce Herbert Hoover, and that of the Joint Board of Engineers which
was established in 192U by the governments of the United States and
"^Majority Report of a subcommittee of the Sen^t^Cpmmittee on
Foreign Relations on S. J. Res. Ill, Sen. Report 8loflj2nd lesgl* (Wash-
ington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 19U8), p. UO.
8Loc. cit.
9Ibid., p. Ul.
1
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Canada. This Joint Board of Engineers rendered its report in 1926
and developed compibe plans for the construction of the seaway.
Pursuant to these recommendations the two governments initiated negoti-
ations, and on June l8, 1932, a treaty was consummated and sent to the
Senate by President Hoover for its advice and consent •'-'-^ The Senate
Foreign Relations Committee held comprehensive hearings over a period
of three months, and the overwhelming majority of the Committee reported
in favor of ratificationj but in March, 193U, when a vote on the reso-
lution was taken, the resolution failed to win the two-thirds majority
required for Senate approval,
H
It remained for the leadership of President Franklin D. Roosevelt
to negotiate a new arrangement with the Government of Canada. Groundwork
was begun in the middle-thirties, and in September, 19liO, a St, Lawrence
Advisory Committee was appointed by the President to meet with a similar
body designated by the Canadian government. It was these bodies which
arrived at an understanding on the engineering aspects of the project outlined
in Chapter I, as well as on the allocation of work between the Canadian
and American governments, should the project be adopted by the two countries
An agreement embodying these arrangements was signed March 19, 19Ul> in
Ottawa, Canadaj by the terms of the agreement itself, it would not come
into operation until approved by the Congress of the United States and the
Parliament of Canada, but o-'^ng to the then-current national defense efforts
and the subsequent bombing of Pearl Harbor, no effort was made at that time
lOlbid., p. utl
11Ibid., p. U3,
/
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to obtain Congressional approval ••'•'^ It is significant that all
attempts to secure adoption of the seaway project since that date
have tsiken the form of legislative bills or resolutions aimed at secur-
ing Congressional approval of the Canadian-American Agreement of 19kl»
In 19Ul and again in 19hh, attempts were made in Congress to
include a resolution embodying approval of the 19Ul Agreement in rivers
and harbors legislation, but both attempts failed. With war at an end.
President Truman sent a message to Congress on October 3, 19h$t asking
Legislative approval of the agreement, and Senator Barkley and nine other
senators introduced Senate Joint Resolution IOI4 for that p-urpose. Immed-
iately the question of procedure was raised; while a majority of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, which held full hearings on the project
through a subcommittee appointed for that purpose, voted to report the
Barkley Resolution, a strong bloc of senators stood ready to oppose its
passage on the ground that the resolution dealt with a subject which should
be dealt with by a formal treaty only, subject to a two-thirds vote of
approval in the Senate. Some saw a parallel between the St, Lawrence
seaway project and the American-British agreement on international commer-
cial aviation, which a resolution of the Senate Committee on Commerce had
declared was too serious a matter to be provided for other than by formal
treaty .-^^ Others harked back to the hearings, held in 19UU by a subcommit-
tee of the Senate Committee on Commerce, on the constitutionality of an
earlier bill intended to provide Congressional authorization of the seaway
ISii-phe Recent Battle in Congress over the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence
Seaway Project", ^le Congressional Digest
,
25^:10:226, October, 19ii6.
13loc. cit.
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project, hearings which had led to a report stating that the treaty form
was required,1^ Despite vociferous objections, the Barkley resolution
was placed on the Senate calendar but was not reached before the 79th Con-
gress adjourned sine die in August, 19U6; it is to the 80th Congress that
we must look for the most recent controversy over the St. Lawrence seaway
project and the 19Ul Canadian- American Agreement which would implement it.
Before moving on to a detailed consideration of the Barkley Resolution
and subsequent developments, it is well to take stock of the events here
reviewed and their implications. Up to the present time proponents of the
proposed seaway project have resorted to two types of procedure, neither of
which has spelled success: the formal treaty, renuiring ratification by a
two-thirds vote of the Senate, and the legislative agreement method, whereby
the two houses put their stamp of approval upon an executive agreement by
simple majority vote. The matter of procedure, which was raised again in
the 80th Congress, requires for its understanding a knowledge of the concepts
involved in the terms, "treaty", "executive agreement', and "legislative
agreement"; and the whole problem of legislative action on the seaway issue
raises questions of a fundamental nature relating to the basic structure,
function and workings of the legislative branch of our government.
(
CHAPTER III
THE SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
AND THE ST. LA^VRENCE SEAWAY PROJECT
Described by President Truman as part of the national program
of "international cooperation, expanding foreign trade and domestic
commerce and industry" , legislation for the proposed St. Lawrence
seaway project was given serious attention by the 79th Congress of
the United States. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held
full hearings through a subcommittee appointed for that purpose, and
the record of those hearings^ totals 1383 closely-printed pages,
embracing the chief arguments pro and con as they existed at that
time. The subcommittee recommended approval of the proposed legislation,
and the full committee endorsed its recommendation and reported to the
Senate the joint resolution introduced by Senator Alben W. Barkley of
Kentucky, Democratic leader of the Senate, and nine other senators
authorizing an agreement vrLth Canada for the undertaking of the project.
The Barkley Resolution, Senate Joint Resolution lOU, was placed on
the Senate calendar but was not reached before the 79th Congress
"^Message of President Truman to the Congress of the United States,
October 3, 19U^, printed as an annex to the Majority Report of a subcommittee
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on S, J, Res. lOU, Senate Report
810
, 79th Congress, 2nd Sess. (Washington, D.C.: United States Government
Printing Office, 19U8), p. 100.
^Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
,
79th Congress , 2nd Sess ., on S^ J. Res. lOU
'
(Washing-
ton, D. C, : United States Government Printing Office, 19U6 )
.
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adjourned sine die in August, 19k6; despite the abortive character of
the resolution in retrospect, it served to touch off nationwide fireworfes
of controversy during the spring and summer of 19U6 and to lay the ground-
work of the more recent controversy in the 80th Congress.
Before turning to an examination of the text of the resolution,
it is important to comprehend the significance of several documents
fundamental to the entire situation. Initially, the controversy over the
St. Lawrence seaway project must be understood within the framework of
two documents: the Executive Agreement of 19Ul between the United States
and Canada, which by its own terms required ratification by a majority vote
of both the United States Congress and the Canadian Parliament and which
has never been so ratified, and the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 between
the United States and Canada, which is still operative today. Since the
resolution in question here (as well as a subsequent joint resolution of
the 80th Congress) was intended merely to bring into operation the 19Ul
Agreement, that sigreement is of primary importance. Negotiated by
representatives of the executive authorities of the two countries, the
19Ul Agreement consists of 11 articles whose purpose is to make the St.
3Lawrence seaway and power project a reality.
Under the terms of Article 1 of the 19Ul Agreement, the governments
of the United States and Canada agree to establish a 10-man Great Lakes-
St. Lawrence Basin Commission, the duties of which would be generally to
supervise construction of the seaway. An equal number of members would be
-^Analysis of the 19Ul Agreement is based upon the authoritative
discussion contained in "The Recent Battle in Congress over the Great
Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway Project", The Congressional Digest , 2^:10:233,
October, 19U6.
rI
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appointed by each country, and Section h of this article would permit
the two governments to abridge or extend the powers and duties of the Com-
mission at any time by an exchange of notes. This commission would disband
upon completion of the seaway, and jurisdiction would then revert to the
International Joint Commission, an organization set up under the terms
of the 1909 treaty.
Article 2 provides that Canada shall undertake to complete its share
of the seaway's power and navigational facilities allocated by the above-
mentioned Commission and to operate or arrange for the operation of all
works located in Canadian territory. Article 3 deals similarly with
American responsibilities for the American share of power and navigational
facilities.
Article k authorizes each country to install power machinery at
the International Rapids section consistent with power requirements. There
would be even distribution of the water available for such purposes, and
the flow of water from Lake Ontario would be regulated so as to prevent
navigational dangers to the harbor of Montreal and the lower St. Lawrence
River. Powerhouse water levels are fixed and defined in this article.
Article 5 states that neither country is to be allowed proprietary,
legislative or administrative rights in the territory of the other under
the terms of this agreement, while Article 6 insures that either govern-
ment may at any time construct within its avm territory alternative facil-
ities for navigation in the international section.
Under the operation of Article 7, rights of navigation accorded
the United States and Canada \mder existing treaties woiild be made
permanent, regardless of the termination provisions of such treaties.
r
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This article has special reference to the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909,
which treaty is terminable upon a years 's notice by either country.
Article 8 sets up regulations for maintaining the level of the
Great Lakes: first, by an agreement that each country shall inform the
other of the amount of water it diverts from the Great Lakes; second, by
allowing the United States and Canada to divert without question amounts
of water equal to such water as may flow into the Great Lakes from their
respective watersheds; third, by requiring disputes over diversions of
Great Lakes water which may exceed authorized diversions as of January 1,
19U0 to be submitted to an arbitration tribunal for settlement; and fourth,
by providing for investigation of coii5)ensatory means of regulating the
lake levels.
Article 9 provides for the preservation of the scenic beauty of
Niagara Falls and relates to diversion of Niagara River waters for power
purposes in excess of the amounts specified in the 1909 treaty. Article 10
provides that each government agrees to provide for the disposition of
such personal and property claims as may arise in the course of construc-
tion, and to be responsible for acquiring such property 7d.thin its
respective territory as is necessary to effect the seaway.
Finally, Article 11 expresses the provision that the agreement is
subject to approval by the United States Congress and the Canadian Parlia-
ment, and is not to come into operation until so approved.
Behind the 19Ul Agreement which remains to be ratified and
which the Barkley Resolution was designed to implement lies the basic
existing treaty between the two governments knovra as the Boundary Waters
Treaty of 1909, By this treaty it was agreed that the navigation of
9
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"all navigable boundary waters shall forever remain free for the purposes
of commerce" to the inhabitants and ships of both countries, subject to the
laws and regulations of either country within its own territory, not incon-
sistent with the privilege of free navigation.^ Mutual freedom of navigation
was extended to Lake Michigan and to all canals, constructed or to be con-
structed, which connect boundary yraters.
Article 3 of the treaty provides, in addition to the uses,
obstructions, diversion, etc., already permitted or hereafter provided for
by special agreement between the two parties, no further uses or obstruc-
tions or diversions affecting the level or flow of the boundary waters shall
be made except on authority of the United States or Canada and ivith the
approval of the International Joint Commission. Ordinary governmental
works for the deepening of channels, construction of breakwaters, etc.
are excepted. Article k goes on to say that, except in cases provided
for by special agreement between the two contracting parties, neither will
permit the construction of any protective works or dams, the effect of which
will be to raise the level of the water, unless the project is approved by
the International Joint Commission, Article 8 provides the following order
of precedence to be observed in the various uses of the boundary waters:
first, uses for domestic and sanitary purposes; second, uses for naviga-
tion purposes; third, uses for power and irrigation purposes. Article 13,
a very important one in the St. Lawrence controversy, provides that in
cases where special agreements between the high contracting parties, v/hich
are the United States and Canada, are referred to in the foregoing articles
of the treaty, such agreements are intended to include not only direct
^Discussion of and quotations from the 1909 Treaty are based upon
provisions of that treaty as cited in ibid
., p. 229.
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agreements between the parties, but also "any nnitual agreement between
them expressed by concurrent or reciprocal legislation on the part of the
United States Congress and the Canadian Parliament." An important proce-
dural argument hangs on this very significant provision.
The Barkley Resolution, designed to vitalize the 19Ul Agreement
(which in turn is linked by the proponents to this latter clause of the 1909
Treaty) is a short resolution; it is quoted below with very little abridge-
ment, in its amended form, the form in which it was reported by the Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations to the Senate:
Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, that, as
provided by article 13 of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909
between the United States and Great Britain... the agreement
between the two countries, dated March 19, 19i4l... is hereby
approved, with the exception of article 7, paragraph c of article
8, and article 9 thereof, and the President is hereby authorized
and empowered to fulfill the undertakings made on behalf of the
United States in said agreement, with the exception of article 7,
paragraph c of article 8, and article 9, upon receipt by him of
satisfactory evidence and approval of said agreement with the
exceptions provided above, by reciprocal or concurrent legis-
lation of Canada.
Sec. 2 - It is the sense of the Congress that it would be
desirable for the President to negotiate with Canada a treaty
or treaties with reference to the matters provided in articles 7
and 9} including provisions with respect to perpetual navigation
rights on the Great Lakes, on the connecting channels and
canals and in the wholly Canadian sections of the St. Lawrence
River, and provisions for the amendment of the Boundary Waters
Treaty of 1909 with respect to diversion of waters at the Niagara
Riverj and to submit such treaty or treaties for the advice and
consent of the Senate of the United States.
Sec. 3 - The President is hereby authorized and directed to
investigate through the Department of State and with the appro-
priate agencies of Canada the feasibility of making the Great
Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway self-liquidating by the imposition
of reasonable charges or tolls on the foreign commerce of the
two countries utilizing the facilities authorized by this joint
resolution, and to report to Congress his findings and recom-
mendations as to whether such charges or tolls are desirable
I
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and feasible in the light of existing treaty and other inter-
national obligations of the United States.
Sec, U,a - There are hereby authorized to be appropriated,
out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated,
such sums as may be required to enable the United States to
carry out the undertakings hereby authorized, b - Unless Con-
gress by law authorizes such action, no amendment of the agree-
ment, and no exchange of notes \inder article 1, section U thereof,
shall impose additional financial or other obligations on the
United States.
Sec, ^ - The President is hereby authorized and directed to
negotiate an arrangement -with the government of the State of
New York for the transfer to the appropriate agency of that
state of the power facilities on the United States side of the
International Rapids constructed pursuant to this joint resolu-
tion, the cost to be determined in accordance with the method
of allocation included in the joint recommendation of the Corps
of Engineers, United States Array and the Power Authority of the
State of New York dated February 7, 1933, presented at public
hearings of the committee on foreign relations on February 10,
1933; provided, that such arrangement is consistent with the
laws of the United States and protects the interests of the
United States and of other statesj and provided further, that
such arrangement will be effective only after approval by the
Congress of the United States and the Legislature of the State
of New York.^
In almost every question of public importance, procedural difficul-
ties as well as differences of opinion on substantive matters are apt to
arise; the question under consideration here is hardly different in this
respect. In fact, it is commonly recognized by those associated with the
seaway movement that one of the great stumbling blocks to the success of the
campaign is the question of legislative procedure . This question has nothing
to do with the merits of the St. Lawrence project as such, but relates to
the method by -vi^iich it must be approved by the American government; since
a public policy of any consequence is imbedded in law, the legal or
^Senate Report 810
,
op
.
cit., p.
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procedural aspects of the matter merit consideration.
Until President Roosevelt directed the State Department, in 19U0,
to negotiate an agreement T^dth the Canadian government for the construc-
tion of the St, Lawrence seaway, all action by the two governments concern-
ing the boundary waters had been by treaty. President Harding, along with
Presidents Coolidge and Hoover, all of whom endorsed the seaway plan,
suggested the treaty method of procedure. In point of fact, the Treaty of
1932, which the Senate rejected in 193U, after the Canadian Parliament had
ratified it, was negotiated during the Hoover Administration,
Partly because the rejection of the Treaty of 1932 by the United
States Senate caused the proponents to fear that they could not muster the
necessary two thirds vote in the Senate, and perhaps partly as an indicataon
of President Roosevelt's tendency to by-pass Congress or take short cuts
whenever possible, the strategy was changed. This change in strategy
resulted in sending the 19i4l Agreement to Congress, not as a treaty re-
quiring the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate, but as a suggested
"legislative agreement" reqiiiring a majority vote of both houses for
approval. In recent years there has been much discussion of treaties,
"executive agreements" and statutory or legislative agreements, and
the distinctions between them are important ones.
A treaty is negotiated by the Executive and is subject to ratifi-
cation by the Senate, two thirds concurring, while an executive agreement
is negotiated and executed by the Executive alone, either under his
constitutional authority or with the advance consent of Congress. The
statutory or legislative agreement method, as it is understood today,
overlaps the executive agreement and involves two concepts: either an
agreement authorized by Congress (by a majority vote of both houses) and
i.rj;>aoo Bi:
' It;")
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concluded by executive negotiation, or an agreement negotiated
initially by the executive and supplemented by a joint resolution
or Act of Congress (again reauiring a majority of both houses),^ The
controversy in Congress concerning the procedure to be followed in the
case of the St. Lawence seaway involved the treaty method versus the
statutory agreement method. As it came to Congress, the St. Lawrence
Agreement of 19Ul was in the form of a statutory agreement, negotiated
by the executive and to be supplemented by action involving a majority vote
of both houses.
This procedural question came alive in 19hh when the Aiken bill,
an earlier attempt to vitalize the 19Ul Agreement, was introduced,
Arthur Krock, Washington Editor of the New York Times , wrote during
that period, as follows
This correspondent believes that a majority of Senators
think that when the writers of the Constitution spoke of a
treaty and made two thirds of the Senate a reouired partner
in validating it, they had in mind continuing commitments by
this country which, once made, cannot be vi(,cated by Congress or any
other domestic power except in accordance with the terms of with-
drawal provided in the original contract. Congress in this same
opinion (supported by a Supreme Court decision in an Indian case),
can repeal the domestic laws that may be a part of a treaty, and
by majority vote. But it cannot vacate the international com-
mitments made in treaty form and two thirds of the Senate,
except as provided in the treaty itself ."^
The terms of withdrawal in a treaty are usually set forth in
a clause providing that either party to the treaty may withdraw upon
written declaration of that intent, given a specified length of time
The Congressional Digest
,
op . cit.
, p, 231.
"^Arthur Krock, article in The New York Times, November 23, 19UU.
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in advance. In the case of the 1909 treaty, a one year notice is
required,
A statutory agreement has the advantage of being easier to
get through Congress because it requires a simple majority in each
house; it has the weakness of not being binding because Congress can,
by passage of a joint resolution or bill, repeal the action it has taken.
A statutory agreement actually amotints to the passage of legislation
authorizing or supplementing an executive agreement, and a president
can vd.thdraw from an executive agreement T^henever he wishes.^
A potent factor in the controversy over the project is the
apparent determination of a majority of the Senators to protect their
constitutional authority to participate in the making of treaties. In
his minority report on the Barkley Resolution, Senator Wallace White of
Maine called attention to this point, ivriting as follows
!
The growing resort in late years by the State Department to
agreements, so-called, in the stead of treaties to be ratified by
the Senate, in itself demands the consideration of this committee
for it marks a bold assertion of executive authority and of
waning Senate importance in the foreign field. 9
Senator Ihite pointed out that from 19U0 to 19UU inclusive,
only 38 treaties were submitted to the Senate as against 2^6 agreements
entered into by President Roosevelt without their submission to the
Senate.
In April of 19U6 the Senate Committee on Commerce, having before
o
"The Congressional Digest , loc . cit,
9
^Minority Report of a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations on S. J. Res. lOh, Senate Report 810 , Part 2, 79th Cong,, 2nd Sess.
(Washington, D.C: United States Government Printing Office, 19U8) p, U3.
Loc. cit.
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it proposed international commercial aviation agreements, adopted a
resolution declaring that international agreements of that degree of
importance should be in treaty form. And as recently as June of 19U8,
Senators were reportedly grumbling about the American handling of the
Six Power Western Agreement on Germany, a commitment to be validated by
this country in the Agreement form, rather than by treaty. These moves
su:e indicative of the Senate's attitude toward its treaty-approving powers.
During the hearings on the Barkley Resolution, Dean Acheson, then
Undersecretary of State, vigorously defended the executive agreement
system, v;hile Dr. Edwin Borchard of the Yale Law School opposed him by
declaring that if the Senate passed the Barkley Resolution, it would lose
its power to participate in treaty making. Before moving on to a more
detailed consideration of these divergent positions, an important pre-
liminary point should be made. The Barkley Resolution ivould have approved
the 19Ul Agreement with Canada with the exception of two articles and a
part of a third article contained in the Agreement. One of the eliminated
articles provided for an amendment to the Treaty of 1909 making naviga-
tion routes perpetual instead of revocable under the one year notice clause.
Another eliminated article provided for an increase in the amount of water
that might be diverted over the amount permitted by the treaty of 1909.
The part of a third article omitted from ratification provided for the
submitting of disputes over diversions of Great Lakes water exceeding
authorized diversions as of January 1, 19l|0, to an arbitral tribunal for
settlement; this elimination was made in committee sind would do away
with the limitations on the diversion of water from the Great Lakes
system and the international section of the St. Lawrence River contemplated
in the agreement, without interfering with the main purpose of the
agreement.
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Thus the Barkley Resolution as reported did not approve the 19Ul
agreement in toto, and questions arose in the minds of Senators as to what
would happen if Congress should approve the agreement as modified by the
Barkley Resolution, Would the President ask Canada to accept the changes?
Would Canada agree? Would Canada make additional changes of her ov/n?
Just what would the status of the agreement be? A mere recommendation in
a Senate Joint Resolution that the President negotiate a treaty to cover
the Senate-rejected Articles 7 and 9 carries no weight; the President
need pay no attention. Therefore, when the Barkley Resolution reached
the floor, it had the effect of modifying the agreement and actually
mixed a legislative proposal and a treaty proposal in the sajne document,
to the bewilderment of many and the further confusion of the whole pro-
cedural question.
I The grounds for utilizing the "agreement" procedure in this case
— that is, an executive agreement implemented by Congressional
acquiescence in the form of a favorable majority vote in both houses
— are three, according to Undersecretary of State Acheson:-'--^first, the
theory of the executive agreement and its constitutionality as a device
for accomplishing international rapprochmentj second, the Treaty of 1909
and particularly. Article 13, thereof; and third, the commerce clause
of the Constitution, which vests in the Congress power to regulate
commerce with foreign nations and among the several states.
Proponents of this procedural method pointed to the Curtiss-Wright
\ Belmont and Pink cases, in which the Supreme Court held that, in certain
limited types of cases, at least, the treaty process is not the only
Hearings on S. J, Res. lOli
,
op. cit.
, pp. 32-3U
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constitutional method of concluding an agreement with a foreign country.
They also mentioned precedents for the specific type of action contemplated
by the seaway resolution, pointing to the joint resolutions which author-
ized the United States to participate in such international organizations
as UNRRA, the I.L.O. and the Food and Agriculture Organization, in addition
to the annexation of Texas and Hawaii through the device of the joint
resolution. These and other precedents, they maintained, clearly demon-
strate that there is nothing unusual in the proposition that the Congress
may exercise its constitutional powers to bring into effect an executive
agreement with a foreign country.
Furthermore, the fact that a treaty on the same subject has pre-
viously failed of ratification does not preclude the exercise by Congress
of its powers v/ith respect to the matter in question. This leads into
the third ground mentioned above, the commerce clause of the Constitution,
which vests important powers in the Congress, According to Undersecre-
tary Acheson, this clause has for over 100 years been construed by the
Supreme Court to vest in Congress plenary powers to control navigation
and to authorize the construction by private interests or by the federal
government of projects relating to the improvement and utilization of
navigable waters including hydro-electric projects. He pointed out
precedents in the history of our relations with Canada and other nations
of the exercise of the powers of Congress to authorize, to approve or
to carry out agreements with foreign countries in the field of the dele-
12
gated powers of Congress.
Some of the examples given, such as the debt-funding agreement
Ibid
., p. 32.
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after the first World War, were negotiated pursuant to prior congressional
authorization and later submitted to Congress for its final approval.
Thus, the secretary made no distinction between the so-called two types
of legislative or statutory agreement v;hich were elucidated earlier — no
distinction between the situation wherein Congress authorizes the Presi-
dent to negotiate an agreement arid then finally passes on it later, and
the situation wherein the President negotiates an agreement on his own
initiative and sends it to Congress for ratification by majority vote.
Indeed, the majority report of the subcommittee, written by Senator Hatch,
stated that
The committee is unable to understand the difference in
principle between the authorization of an agreement on the
one hand and the approval of an agreement on the other, or
how the Congress, not having the power to approve a previously
negotiated sigreement, could vote itself such power by author-
izing the execution of an agreement to be submitted later for its
I
approval, 1^
Undersecretary Acheson was careful to point out that there are
obviously certain classes of foreign arrangements which must be reserved
exclusively for the treaty power. Furthermore, he made it clear that
in considering the St, Lawrence agreement
We are not dealing with the type of so-called executive
agreement that can be entered into by the President under
his own, exclusive powers as Chief Executive and diplomatic officer
of the government and commander-in-chief of the armed forces,,,
Vtfhat we are concerned with in this case is a foreign agreement
which by its terms, does not become effective until the necessary
enabling legislation of the two countries has been obtained and
which, because of the very nature of its subject matter, cannot
be carried out in the absence of such legislation .
•^^Senate Report 810
,
op
,
cit ,, p. 80
^^Hearir^s
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He pointed out many examples of arrangements of great importance
to the economic relations of the two countries which have been con-
cluded through the enactment of reciprocal legislation: joint
commissions created by reciprocal legislation to supervise the construc-
tion of great bridges over international streams such as the Niagara and
the St. Lawrence rivers and to supervise such bridges, reciprocal legis-
lation extending to nationals of both coiintries reciprocal privileges to
render aid to vessels of their respective nationalities in distress,
and other such arrangements. He filed a memorandum r efuting the contention
that Congress cannot authorize the expenditure of funds for construction
in foreign countries.
The final ground on which this procedure rests is the Boundary
Waters Treaty of 1909, which granted reciprocal rights of navigation to
the citizens of the two nations in boundary waters and also granted rights
so long as the treaty should remain in force to navigation in the waters
of Lake Michigan and of canals connecting boundary waters. As Acheson
pointed out, it has been the position of the Department of State for many
years that the waters of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence system o^onstitute
a common waterway open to common use by the citizens and commerce of
the two countries.-^^
In addition to the 1909 Treaty, earlier treaties were still in
existence dealing conclusively with the question of reciprocal navigation
rights. Furthermore, it is Acheson 's opinion that the 1909 Treaty, by
its own terms, was designed to settle all questions then pending between
the two countries involving the rights and interests of either in relation
^^Ibid. p. 1061;
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to the other along their common frontier, and to make provision for the
adjustment and settlement of all such questions as might thereafter arise.
According to Secretary Root's testimony before the Foreign Relations
Committee at the time of Senate ratification of the 1909 Treaty, it was
felt necessary to provide a procedure for dealing mth ouestions
involving boundary waters in view of the difficulty which had been ex-
perienced in concluding arrangements with Canada ovdng to the necessity
of dealing through London, State Department spokesmen have stated that
the 19Ul agreement could properly and constitutionally be approved by
Congress on the basis of the procedure for agreement prescribed by the
1909 Treaty, The special agreements to which the vital Article 13 relates,
in the text of the treaty, are those ?rhich are made in relation to "uses
or obstructions or diversions, whether teii5)orary or permanent, of boundary
waters on either side of the line, affecting the natural level or flow
of boundary waters on the other side of the line,"-'-^ And to the subcom-
mittee members responsible for the majority report approving Senate
Joint Resolution 10b, it seemed beyond argument that canals and power
dams are "uses, obstructions or diversions" vdthin the meaning of the
1909 treaty for purposes referred to in Article 8 of such treaty,namely,
"navigation and power,"
The opposition to this point of view was led by Dr. Borchard, a
distinguished expert on constitutional matters, who met all three of the
grounds utilized by the proponents. First, while maintaining that the
Congressional Digest
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c
28
founding fathers recognized the distinction between mere agreements cr
compacts on the one hand, and treaties on the other (although no mention
of "agreements" is made in the Constitution, save for the provi.sion con-
cerning interstate compacts). Dr. Borchard declared that the proposed
procedure in the present case falls between two stones: neither an execu-
tive agreement in the proper sense nor a treaty, it is a
hybrid and not provided for in the Constitution. It is
not an executive agreement, for such agreement would come into
force on signature; and it is not a treaty — although it deals
wdth a subject suitable to treaty riT for it does not come to the
Senate for its advice and consent.
He maintained there are t7;o major classes of executive agreements:
first, those authorized by Congress, and second, those negotiated by the
President on his own responsibility. Dr. Borchard made a distinction
between prior congressional consent to negotiation and presidential nego-
tiation of an agreement vdth the document presented to Congress for later
majority approval. He found no constitutional basis for the latter, saying
that an executive agreement is submitted to the Congress for its infor-
mation only. The Congress cannot change the agreement, but can only assent
or decline it by majority vote; indeed, an executive agreement need
not be ratified at all, although in certain cases (such as the Bretton
Woods Agreement)^^ the President has delayed signature until Congress
signified its assent, v^hich, for all practical purposes, amounted
to a kind of ratification. Therefore, the subject matter involved in an
executive agreement of the second class mentioned above must be within the
power of the president. Congress can, hov^ever, in effect "delegate" to
the president the poy^er to negotiate in a field -^here Congress has the
Constitutional power to act, and, in fact, most executive agreements made
18
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in the past have been of this type. The Curtiss-Wright decision, which
the proponents cited, is just such a case. Congress had elucidated the
policy in advance of Presidential proclamation. In fact, one of the points
to be adjudicated in the case was the question of whether the delegation
was valid; hence, it was clearly a matter of authority delegated by the
Congress to the President. However, the St, Lawrence seaway does not
represent a delegation of authority by Congress to the President, for the
19Ul Agreement was made without prior congressional consent to negotia-
tion and such consent could not properly have been given; nor does the
subject fall within the normal powers and ^[unctions of the Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy or the principal diplomatic officer of the
United States. And as Article 11 of the 19i4l Agreement shows, it did not
come into force on signature. For all these reasons, the 19Ul agreement
is not a true executive agreement and the St. Lawrence seaway could not
constitutionally be the subject of an executive agreement; hence, by the
process of elimination, the seaway must necessarily be considered a subject
suitable only to the treaty form.
The extensive dicta included in the Curtiss-Wright case by
Mr, Justice Sutherland served to give impetus to the movement for broaden-
ing executive agreements, although such dicta were not binding per se.
Dr. Wallace McClure, Assistant Chief of the Treaty Division, Department
of State, has written to the effect that anything that can be accomplished
by treaty can be accomplished by executive agreement without Congress if
possible, with Congress if necessary, In Dr. Borchard's opinion, such
departures from genuine executive agreements and from the treaty form
International Executive Agreements by Wallace McClure (New York:
19U0), quoted in Hearings , op . cit . p.
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are infinitely dangerous, and the development of hybrid forms on certain
occasions in the past does not .justify continuation of this strange breeding
process. And in Dr. Borchard's own words;
I'Vhatever justification there may be for the executive
agreement within its proper scope or for congressional
legislation within the authority of Congress, there is no
constitutional v/arrant whatever for the suggestion that the
President has an option to submit his compact either to the
Senate as a treaty... or to the Congress for majority approval.
Analyzing the executive agreement. Dr. Borchard drew the follo-^vang
conclusions: it is strictly limited and can deal only with subjects
especially delegated by Congress or, if made independently by the executive,
only with nonnal powers vested in the commander-in-chief and principal
diplomatic officer, and such agreement cannot do what Congress cannot do.
It need not be ratified by the United States and it binds only so long
as it suits both sidesj it morally binds only the signing executive and not
his successors, is subject to repeal by act of Congress both domestically
and internationally, and can be so repealed at any time (although it cannot
itself repeal an act of Congress.)
An executive agreement, with a few exceptions as to contrary state
law or when made pursuant to Act of Congress, is not the supreme law of
the landj it cannot alter or modify a treaty; it invites secrecy, since
the President can make it without notifying anyone, and it is not
"submitted" to Congress in the usual sense, for consideration or for
approval, rejection, amendment or reservations. 2 2 Furthermore, the
executive agreements made by the express authorization of Congress appear
to be completely dependent for their effectiveness upon the authorizing
21
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legislation, terminable at the discretion of Congress; Dr, Borchard alleged
that this was further indication that any mere agreement with Canada
would not be binding upon the United States,
The retort of the proponents that "since any legislative enactment
— including the Boulder Canyon project act, for example — is subject
to later modification or repeal, the point has no particular force as
bearing upon the constitutional issue under consideration" seems not
only inadequate but mistaken; Dr, Borchard 's point would seem to have
force for the reason that legislative action is the heart of such agree-
ments, whereas it is secondary in the matter of implementing treaties.
The fact that some past treaties may be rendered hollow shells by legis-
lative action on their domestic aspects does not change the fact that
international commitments under treaties stand, and their good faith
rests, upon their known superiority to acts of Congress,
In connection with Congress's power under the commerce clause,
Dr, Borchard admitted that Congress has power to deal with numerous
matters that may become the subject of treaty settlements, matters having
both an international and a domestic aspect, but maintained that the
authorization by Congress of a simple facility (like a bridge over the
Niagara River) on condition of Canadian cooperation, does not affect the
question whether the St, Lawrence seaway can be concluded by an executive
agreement instead of treaty. It would seem that the proponents, in
developing their argument based upon the commerce clause, involved them-
selves in a contradiction. Maintsiining that Congress may exercise its
constitutional powers despite the fact that an agreement ivith a foreign
•^Senate Report 8lO
,
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country is invdired, they insisted that there is no distinction between
the situation wherein Congress authorized the President in advance to
negotiate an agreement and the situation -A-herein Congress merely ratified
by majority vote an agreement negotiated by the president on his ovm.
initiative.
On the basis of their first argument they must recognize a dis-
tinction between the two types of congressional "authorization"; following
the first argument to its logical conclusion, the Congress (whenever its
constitutional powers, such as those derived from the commerce clause,
are involved) should take the lead in determining policy, despite any
international ramifications involved. It should direct the presid3nt
to enter into negotiations, rather than permit him to take the initiative.
In other words, the first argument implies congressional supremacy, a
strong Congress; and such a Confrress should not be willing to abdicate
any of its powers, even where international relations are involved.
Allowing the president to act as negotiator. Congress should determine
ViHEN and V^HAT he is to negotiate; Congress should be the policy maker.
Forgetting the distinction between prior congressional consent
to negotiation and subsequent congressional approval of agretim^ts
initiated by the executive, and following the first argument to its
logical extreme, the position which it implies leads ultimately to a
negation of a large part of the treaty concept, md of the treaty power
lodged in the president and the Senate. For the distinguishing mark of
a treaty, primarily, is its international character; a treaty does not
partake of its name primarily because of its subject matter, but because
it deals with relations between nations. A broad interpretation of the
commerce clause, an even broader interpretation than we now know, would
f€
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make serious inroads upon the treaty power as we understand it and as the
Supreme Court has interpreted it.
On the other hand, a strict interpretation of the treaty power,
such as Dr. Borchard entertains, rests upon a belief that the consti-
tutional powers of Congress are curtailed to some extent where international
relations are concerned — a belief that is borne out by most of the
relevant Supreme Court decisions, notably those which enunciate the
doctrine that a treaty is the supreme law of the land. Dr. Borchard
suggested something of this line of reasoning when he said
If it is true that the limitations on the powers of
Congress deal only with its power to legislate on domestic affairs
and not with its power to authorize or sanction agreements -with
foreign powers, then Congress can arrogate to itself by the
same majority that enacts legislation the power to control all
subjects -vrtiich could become the subject of executive agreements
with foreign powers. They could thus acquire jurisdiction over
all state matters. The only difference between a treaty and
a statute would be that in one case the president signs first
and in the second case the president signs last.
Finally, Dr. Borchard contended that the subject matter of the
Treaty of 1909 is so different from that of the 19Ul Agreement and the
Barkley Resolution that these latter two could not be embraced by
Article 13 of the former. 26 Article 13, he convincingly maintained,
refers to Articles 3 and U of the same treaty, which in turn deal with
excusing the International Joint Commission from passing upon unilateral
uses, obstructions and diversions which are alleged to inflect injury
upon the other party, provided the governments themselves speciailly agree,
by reciprocal legislation or otherwise, upon the permissibility of the
unilateral act. It is significant that neither of these articles defines
2^Ibid., p. U37.
^^Ibid., p. U2U.
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or, indeed, says aitything whatever about Tihat things can be done by-
special agreement. According to a memorandxim of the Honorable J, E,
Read, Legal Advisor of the Department of External Affairs of Canada,
dated^ March 12, 19Ulj Articles 3 and U,
..•do not in themselves enable developments to be undertaken
by special agreement — they merely except cases covered
by special agreement from the reouirement of approval by
the commission article 13 does not lend itself to a
construction that vfould make it an enabling article. The
...meaning that one is bound to attribute to this article
is that the 'special agreements' under articles 3 and U do
not need to be treaties sanctioned by the senate. They may be
direct agreements between the High Contracting Parties or
mutual agreements expressed by concurrent or reciprocal
legislation. It seems to be clear that this article cannot
be interpreted as enabling a special agreement to be made in
such a manner as to endow the agreement ^.vith elements of
validity drawn from the Boundary Viaters Treaty. It can only
be interpreted as enabling a special agreement to except
specific works from the requirements of articles 3 and U.
Furthermore, as Senator Burton brought out in the 19Ui; hearings
on the Aiken bill, 28 the 19Ul Agreement covers different waters from
the treaty of 1909 and embraces different terms from that treaty. For
example, the treaty of 1909 covers only boundary Y/aters vrtiile the Agree-
ment of 19Ul includes the Canadian section of the St. Lawrence River down
to Montreal and beyond. The fact that in the past the governments have
assumed that it would not be possible to carry out by special agreement
under Article 13 arrangements for the development of boundairy waters and
that they have adopted independent conventional arrangements (e.g., the
Lake of the Woods Convention, the Rainy Lake Watershed Convention and the
Niagara Convention of 1929) is a powerful argument strengthening the
position of the opponents.
27Quoted in ibid., p.U31.
^^Ibid., p. U32
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The whole procedural ouestion, in addition to its technical and
legalistic nature, is rendered more significant and mere inscrutable
by its strategic importance, I'Vhile it in no way relates to the merits
of the seaway project, it is at once the device by lAiiich the proponents
hope to gain most ready acceptance of the project, and the method which
many opponents choose to fight it effectively. Although substantive
provisions should not be obscured by procedural bickering, it ever remains
true that the way a matter is accomplished must count for a great deal.
In this case it is not unfair to conclude that a major constitutional
question is genuinely involved, regardless of the motives of those who
raise the question. Whatever their secret aims may be, the opponents
have placed an important stumbling bbck in the way of realizing the St.
Lawrence seaway project^ through le gisiatiw^ implementation of an
executive agreement.
Turning to a consideration of the substantive aspects of the
seaway project, one is faced with a mass of conflicting facts and opinions
at every point. Since the project is a two-fold one, involving both
navigation improvement and electric-power-producing facilities, and
since the hearings embrace all aspects of the project without any logical
organization except for a clear-cut differentiation between self-styled
opponents and proponents, the arguments on all points are intermingled
freely. It is well to remember that an individual or group desirous of
defeating the seaway project need only attack one of the two primary
aspects; since the project must be proved feasible in both respects, it
is vulnerable to attack on both fronts.
The arguments on the Barkley Resolution hinge on the follo'Aang
chief topics: the costs involved, the economic benefit or harm which the
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seaway would bring, the short season and the general navigation conditions
on the river and in the lakes, the defense aspects of the project, the
practicability of the 27 foot channel depth proposed and the ships that
could be expected to use the seaway, and the hydroelectric power aspects
of the project, with emphasis upon the federal-state accord between New
York State and the federal government. The mere enumeration of these
pivotal points, which by no means exhaust the total subject matter for
debate, attests to the complicated nature of the project and the mag-
nitude of its ramificationsj in connection with many of the debatable
points, the basic facts are in dispute as well as the interpretations
of the facts.
Furthermore, a decision one way or the other on the merits of the
project requires not merely an understanding of the real facts, which
themselves are confused, but a comprehension of the relevant facts. Even
a superficial analvsis of the hearings reveals that in some respects the
proponents have failed to discover the importance of relevancy; they have
freely mingled valid arguments with specious ones. On the other hand,
the opponents fight on two fronts and maintain a basically inconsistent
position: saying in one breath that the St. Lawrence seaway would be a
failure as a navigational project, they contend in the next that a suc-
cessfiil St. Lawrence seaway would be highly injurious to many established
ports and industries. While this double-barreled approach might be a
good defensive tactic in a court of law, and is not to be condemned at
the hearings, its use in the chambers of Congress throws suspicion upon
the real convictions and motives of legislators meditating upon the wisdom
of a proposed policy. It is the purpose of the remainder of this chapter
to illustrate and prove these conclusions, and to indicate the direction
€
in which a logical and reasonably objective consideration of the
seaway project should ideally move,
A striking example of fundamentally different ways of viewing the
project is provided by two dramatic statements contained in the majority
and minority reports respectively of the subcommittee which conducted
the hearings on the Barkley Resolution. The proponents optimistically
stated in the majority report that the seaway is already 90 per cent
complete in terms of geography,^^ while the opponents preferred to
say that it is but 10 per cent complete in terns of cost. 31 Both
statements are reasonably accurate; since the cost figures on which the
opponents* conclusion is based are the proponents' own, there is no dis-
agreement. However, the contrast between the statements gives vivid
illustration of basic differences in attitude and a suggestion of the
polemics of the whole situation. The actual cost of the entire project,
including Canadian and American shares in the develooment, was given in
terms of moneys already expended by the two governments and estimates of
further svms required for completion by Lt. Gen. R. A. YiTieeler, Chief
of Engineers of the United States Army; his figures are as follows :32
Moneys already expended: United States $ 31,7U2,000
CanadfiL. 132,672,000
$l6U,Iaii,000
Moneys to be expended: United States 310,27U,000
Canada lUU,8l2,000 U$$, 086,000
Total Final Cost $619,500,000
Senate Report 810, op , cit ., p.
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The weakness inherent in this presentation lay in the fact
that ^E^^estimates for works intended primarily for power (not segre-
gated in the above breakdown) were admittedly based upon prices
prevailing in 1939, the last year when definitely stable prices for that
type of work prevailed prior to the constantly increasing prices of pre-
war and Wcirtime periods; and the estimates for the balance of the work
were based on costs exist^n^^ in 19Ulj since sufficient work of that
type was current at the time v/ithin the scope of projects being constructed
by the Corps of Engineers to determine the project's cost in terms of
I9UI prices,
It remained for the opponents to produce an engineer -wiio calculated
the costs in terms of increased prices to the end of 19hS, using 35 per
cent as the increased overall cost percentage. The opponents went on to
add an item for interest during construction and to estimate addi tonal
STjuns required for complementary items and for the building of adequate
port and harbor facilities in Great Lakes port cities, then to estimate
costs for channel depths greater than the proposed 27 feet, until total
figures soaring high above the estimates of the Army Engineers had been
introduced into the record.3U Although the proponents coTintered by
pointing out that harbor improvement items are not properly chargeable to
waterway development but are undertaken by private and municipal author-
ities whenever traffic will justify them and are supported by appropriate
charges on cargoes, the proponents had been maneuvered into a bad
strategic position by their very conservative estimates. Even to the
Ibid
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casual reader it must be immediately. apparent that cost estimates based
upon 1939 and 19Ul price levels were of little value in 19h6, when these
hearings were taking place, and are of even less value in 19U9 as this paper
is being written,
A telling argument was offered by the opponents when it was
pointed out that the expenditure of $70^,568,000 on all United States
seacoast harbors and canals (a cumulative cost to June 30, 19UU) has resulted
in facilities capable of handling at least 359,000,000 tons of traffic
annually, while the expenditure of 1523,617,000 on the seav^ay project by
the United States (an "inflated" opposition figure, not the Army
Engineers' estimate) wo\ild result in increasing the capacity of an ex-
isting facility to the extent of only about 10,000,000 tons of United
States traffic annually, While this argument overlooks the power
benefits which would also flow from the completed project, it serves to
focus attention upon the basic limitations of traffic capacity imposed
by geography; the 10,000,000 tons of new United States traffic estimated
for the completed St. Lawrence seaway is a figure contained in the
St , Lawrence Survey of the Department of Commerce, Tindertaken in 19Ul,
although qualified therein as conservative. However, it is v^ell to
consider this dramatic statement in connection with other arguments offered
by the opposition, particularly those which maintain that great hardships
to established ports would follow the opening of the St, Lawrence to ocean-
going traffic. If the percentage of shipping to be handled is so small
in comparison with that now carried by existing port^ it follows that
those ports as a group cannot suffer to any great degree. And since
'Senate Report 810 , Part 2, 0£. cit. , p, 32,

several ports, including New York, Boston, Providence, Baltimore and
New Orleans^vied with each other in the loudness of their pleas for mercy,
it is apparent that some fears must be unjustified.
Witnesses for the proponents presented detailed arguments to prove
that substantial savings would accrue on specific articles and commodities
shipped via the seav;ay, and a general prediction of savings up to $0 per
cent of the present land and v/ater costs was made.^7 'j>^q proponents also
relied upon the St. Lawence Survey made by the Department of Commerce
in 19Ul, referred to above; this study, directed by Mr. N. R, Daniellian,
studied seventeen commodities and showed the savings made thereon by
utilizing the proposed St. Lawrence ship canal. But the seaway's oppon-
ents, particularly the spokesmen of the Association of American Railroads,
took exception to the facts presented in the St. Lawrence Survey on four
grotinds. First, they maintained that the Survey erred in calculating
the tonnage to be transported on the seaway, because the false assumption
was made that all possible traffic moving into or out of the territory
tributary to the waterway ?iOuld shift from other forms, -A'here theoreti-
cally lower rates could be shoym by the v^raterway. These opponents main-
tained that factors other than rates affect the movement of traffic.
Secondly, they criticized the Survey assumption that the rates to and
from the Great Lakes ports would be the same as to and from ports on the
Northern Atlantic seaboard. In the third place, they stated that the
savings determined in the Survey were universally and incorrectly based
upon the difference between the assumed waterway rate and the all rail
rate, although in most instances rail-water, water-rail and rail-water-
^
"^Hearings
,
o£. cit., pp. llU ff., PP. 1183, 1209
38lbid., p. 589.

rail routes were available at substantially lower rates than the all
rail rate. Finally, the opponents maintained the Survey ignored the
competition of existing inland waterways which lie wholly within the
United States and which are now carrying much of the potential tonnage
assigned to the St. Lawrence route.
The proponents answered the second objection above by pointing
to the actual practice of small ships of foreign steamship lines then
operating on the shallow existing channels of the St. La'Arrence route;
ships of several Scandinavian lines had found the route profitable and
were actually delivering cargoes to the lake ports via the all water
route on a basis comparable to delivery at the North Atlantic seaboard.39
The other three criticisms, like the propositions to vrhich they are
addressed, are beyond the capacity of the layman to evaluate; they are
technical arguments which can only be tested by expert knowledge of the
transportation field and actual transportation practice. They serve to
illustrate the thesis that the empirical approach has no substitute,
that deductive testing of the internal logic of arguments is valuable
only to a limited extent, that objective, expert and reliable presenta-
tions of the facts must be available in order to test the relationship
existing between arguments presented on behalf of or in opposition to a
proposed policy, on the one hand, and the real world in v/hich that policy
will operate if passed, on the other. Vfe do not live in a "paper" world,
yet "paper" arguments assail us on all sides; the limitations of our
environment, of our access to the relevant facts dictate our urgent need
Ibid
., p. 186.
r
U2
for experienced observers and the expertise of trained fact reporters.
The St. Lawrence Survey of 19Ul is a basic study, the third with-
in a period of ten years undertaken by the Department of Commerce of the
United States t>T the purpose of projecting the St. LaiA-rence seaway into
a realistic geographic and economic setting and analyzing the project in
terms of feasibility, usefulness, need and probable economic effects,
both adverse and beneficial, short range and long term. It is called
into question and brought to task by witness after witness, on point after
point, throughout the hearings; the questioning of its validity throws
the hearings into new confusion at every turn. This situation presents
the dilemma of an extensive and detailed study, undertaken by an official
government agency doing at least lip -service to the ideal of objectivity,
dissected freely during public hearings devoted to the very subject of
which the study treats. The dilemma is a very real and forceful one,
suggestive of a basic conflict between the practice of free and open
policy making (and the democratic theory which underlies that practice)
on the one hand, and the criterion of expertise on the other. It raises
the difficult question of the degree to which expert testimony, presented
under official auspices, is to be accepted; it poses problems inherent
in the concepts of bureaucracy, officialdom, even technocracy. Experts
challenge experts in the pages of the printed hearings; self-styled experts
and recognized experts lend countenance to the arguments of both pro-
ponents and opponents; and experts appear under the auspices of such
organizations as the Association of American Railroads, the National St.
Lawrence Project Conference
,
and the Great Lakes Tidewater Association.
In some cases, these affiliations underscore and emphasize the very exper-
tise which is claimed for them; in other cases, their affiliations render
cc
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the experts suspect. In any case, the term "expert" is subject to much
use, misuse and abuse, and the layman faces the fretful question, what
are — or should be — the qualifications of an expert?
Since the whole controversial question of feasibility rests
not only upon physical facts and their interpretation in engineering
plans, but also upon cost factors, economic benefit and harm, and
predictions of seaway utility, even the most carefully managed and closely
reasoned debate on the seaway could hardly be brought entirely out of
the realm of speculation. Thus, the Army Engineers are doubted when they
present their plans, cost estimates, and particularly when they attest
to the wisdom from an engineering point of view of linking the power
project and navigation improvement works in one project. The Survey
is further contested by lake shippers of experience, like Captain Thomas
H, Saunders of the International Shipmasters Association of the Great
Lakes, who attest to the treacherous conditions of navigation on the
lakes, the snake-like twists and turns of the river, the hazardous fog
conditions, whioh^ despite the Survey '
s
refutation of these charges,
presumably based upon investigation and the testimony of qualified
men.Ul xhe Joint Chiefs of Staff leave themselves open to obvious criti-
cism by their statement in the record that although the St. Lawence
valley must be considered as a possible route for invasion of this
continent, the proposed improvements would not facilitate such invasion
because the power plants, locks and canals coul^ readily be rendered
^ Ibid., p. 869 ff.
^llbid
., p. U72.
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unusable in the event that such action were necessary,^^ obviously,
if this country could render the seaway unusable very readily, enemy
bombers could do the same, and could also, as pointed out by the opponents,
completely bottle up the shipping caught inside the point of bombing.
Estimates of traffic offered by the Department of Commerce are contested
by witness after witness for the opponents; the estimated volume of
16,000,000 new tons of traffic annually (of which 10,000,000 would be
American and 6,000,000 Canadian), added to the existing 9,000,000 tons
annually, giving a total of 2^,000,000 tons annually (exclusive of
strictly lake traffic) is deemed "purely speculative" and discounted for
the same reasons which the Association of American Railroads gave for
doubting the validity of the St» Lav/rence Survey findings.
The steady growth of foreign shipping over the existing lU foot
channel during the years follovdng the first World War is cited by propon-
ents as an evidence of the possibilities for real expansion with a 2?
foot channel. The Fjell line of Norway had a regular schedule for
sailings over the St. Lawrence route with seventeen ships in service
prior to the outbreak of the second World War, the Oranje Line of the
Netherlands utilized the route, and midwestern interests were negoti-
ating with Polish, Swedish, Belgian and French Shipping lines when
the war broke out. ^3 Reference to the Panama Canal and its impact on
the Midwest is made by literally scores of witnesses, who argue that the
cheap water transportation afforded by the Panama Canal operates to the
benefit of east and west coast industry and agriculture at the expense
of midwestern producers, since it is considerably cheaper to ship coast-
^^Ibid
., p. 29.
^^3ibid., p. 131.
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to-coast through the Panama Canal than by rail. The midwest is forced to
pay the high rail rates east or west, depending upon the direction of
sales, and cannot take advantage of the less expensive water route
j
development of the St, Lawrence waterway would improve the competitive
position of midwestern agriculture and industry.^ Evidence is read
into the record to indicate that the railroads opposed the Panama Canal
development, fearing it would detract from their business; yet the records
of the Interstate Commerce Commission show that tonnage carried by all
western railroads (I'iiich were chiefly concerned about the competition
of the Panama Canal) increased every year from 19lU to 1930.^^ Warning
of the depletion of the Mesaba Range, with the need of importing quantities
of high grade iron ore in the not far distant future, is another tactic
utilized by midwestern proponents of the seaway, who maintain that the
St. Lawrence offers the best route for importing such a bulk commodity
into the middle of the continent, especially in view of recent discover-
ies of ore in Labrador. Another interesting view is that the famous
and traditional isolationism of the Midwest may, in large part, be attri-
buted to the landlocked condition of that section of the nation. ^"^
John Beukema of the Michigan Great Lakes Tidev/ater Commission,
George Hardy of the Toledo World Port Coinmittee, and other witnesses
presented the theory that ships are major originators of rail traffic,
Rail lines and sea lanes are complementary, not competitive, and it is
^Ibid., p, 80; p, 99; p, 136; p, 320
^^Ibid ,, p, 320
^^Ibid., p, 313.
^''ibid,, p. 78,
^^Ibid,, p. 133.
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therefore shortsighted to assume that the increased number of tons per
year which the improved seaway could handle would be taken away from
the railroads. On the contrary, it is more logical to assume that most
of this seaway traffic would be new and additional business. The improve-
ment of a river has most frequently resulted in prosperity and growth for
the port city or cities on the improved waterway, and has also resulted in
increased tonnage for the railroads serving that area. According to the
witnesses, such results obtained for Toronto, Milv^aukee, Montreal and Los
Angeles. Railroads carry most of their tonnage to and from ports, not
between inland points, and the largest and most important cities of the
world are port cities, cities iflhich have the benefit and stimulation of
low cost water transportation. Furthermore, these gentlemen conclude, even
if the 10,000,000 tons of new American seaway traffic estimated by the
19Ul Survey were entirely diverted from the railroads, the total tonnage
diverted would not exceed one per cent of the total tons of originating
traffic on United States Class One railroads.
Another line of argument advanced by the railroads through the
Association of American Railroads spokesman is that the roads ivill have
to keep extra equipment to meet the mnter traffic while the seavvay is
closed by ice, and that the seaway will skim off the cream of the summer
traffic,^^ The proponents countered with the argument that the seaway
presents merely a question of adjusting the rolling stock of the railroads
over the next two decades to an improved peak-load condition resulting
from the seaway, This can be done, the proponents maintained, without
^^Ibid,, p, 588 ff,
^^Ibid.
, p. 1155
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financial or economic harm to the railroads by better planning of their
new construc-tion program. Graphic evidence v;-as introduced to show that the
peak of traffic on the railroads is reached in October, and that the
lowest point comes in February and March, ivhen the seaway would be
closed, ^-^ Thus, at the present time, without the deepwater seaway, the
railroads have to maintain sufficient rolling stock to take care of the
pesdc during the summer. What the seaway, in effect, will do, according
to this line of reasoning, is to shave dorni the summer peak burden on
the railroads, thus resulting in better average utilization of rolling
stock that the railroads woiild otherwise have to maintain in order to
handle the summer peak. In the above manner, the proponents explain
away the most dangerous implication of the four to five month freeze
on the St, Lawrence River, It is well to remember in this connection
that Montreal, with the same limited season, is North America's second
largest port; and the total tonnage passing through the 3oo Canal in an
eight month season exceeds by a wide margin the combined tonnage of the
Panama, Suez and Kiel Canals in their twelve month seasons.
The protests of existing ocean ports vho feared economic injury
were met in this manner: of course, say the proponents. New York will
lose some of its foreign traffic at first and Buffalo some of its grain
transfer business (although the Regional Director of the CI.O. for the
Buffalo region, Mr. Hugh Thompson, asserted that the grain business
for transfer purposes that the opponents charge vdLll be lost has, indeed,
already been lost and that most of the Buffalo elevators now store grain
5l
Loc . cit. (Hearings)
^^Ibid ,, p. 1152,1153
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for flour and feed mills which will remain in Buffalo despite transporta-
tion changes^3). Gradually, the seaway will redound to the benefit of all
these ports that now complain; New York Harbor will acquire new water
borne traffic to and from the Great Lakes Area, and Buffalo will gain
new traffic, both from domestic and foreign sources. In each case, the
additional traffic resulting from the seaway will more than offset the
losses. Naturailly, some dislocations must be expected at first since
any new and sizeable development brings changes in its wake, but
iiltimately what gives impetus to commerce in one section of the country
(and the section in question here contains forty to fifty million people
and UO per cent of the industry and agricultural production in the United
States) improves the commercial health of all.
The question of how practical the proposed 27 foot channel depth
is and what ships could use such a channel is another matter about which
there is fundamental disagreement concerning the basic facts. The pro-
ponents' experts maintain that ships with a 2^ foot draft could use the
channel when they are fully loaded; the opponents present experts who
say that even ships with a 2h foot draft would be unable to navigate a
27 foot channel. Factors like the difference in displacement between salt
and fresh water and the port warden regulations at Montreal constantly
arise to plague agreement on this matter. If the adversaries cannot agree
on a simple and apparently objective fact like this, agreement on the
whole seaway matter appears hopeless. Mr. Edward Macauley, vice chair-
man and acting chairman of the United States Maritime Commission, is
^^ibid., p. 355.
^^Senate Report 810 , Part 2, oo. cit., p. 39
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the proponents* expert witness, and he testifies that there is ample
tonnage existing of the reouisite 2$ foot draft and imder in both the
United States and foreign coiranercial fleets to take care of the anti-
cipated coimnerce in the St. Lav/rence seaway. However, the opponents,
while maintaining that 2h feet is the maximum draft in order to insure
safe navigation of the 27 foot channel, point out, without refutation,
that only 8.7 per cent of the gross tonnage of the American Merchant
Marine has a draft of 2^ feet or less and that the same is true of
only l8.7 per cent of the world's tonnage. However, it is pointed out
to the proponents' advantage that ships of greater than 27 foot draft,
like the Victory and Liberty ships, could navigate the canal loaded to
79 per cent and 85 per cent of total dead-weight carrying capacity
respectively. This fact takes on added significane when it is shown
that the preponderance of vessels transiting the Panama Canal normally
have been vessels loaded only to two thirds of capacity. With an allowance
of an additional eight or nine per cent of the total dead-weight capacity
for fuel, water and supplies, a load of 75 per cent of dead-weight
capacity would appear to be typical of vessels which would transit such
waterways as the St. Lawrence seav^ay.
The power aspects of the seaway project provoke their own contro-
versies and could well be the subject of an extensive separate study.
The International Rapids hjndroelectric power development is generally
acknowledged to have certain natural and remarkable geographical advantages,
nowhere challenged by the opponents, A phenomenally even flow of water,
natural lakes acting as storage reservoirs, relative economy of installation
in comparison with other hydroelectric power stations and an antn cipated
output which would equal in one year the 19Uh output of all the hydro-
Hearings, o£. cit., p. 103
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electric developments of the entire T.V.A, are among the advantages.
There are only eight countries in the -wrorld whose total output of
electricity equals the potential generation of this one power station.
The estimated cost of producing electricity at the plant is lower than
for any plant in the United States, vdth the possible exception of
the Niagara River,"^' Although some few witnesses s questioned the need
of the United States for new power developments and tried to prove that
New York State and the surrounding area is declining in power require-
ments, it is significant that the subcommittee minority report does not
incorporate such arguments and tacitly admits the need for power, as well.
The statements of the Federal Power Commissioner^^ and of New York State
and New England representatives attesting to high power rates in those
areas, ^ the Rural Electrification Commission's statistics on the high
niimber of unelectrified farms in that area^*^ and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
report that this region constituted a "pov^er deficit area"^-^ during World
War II seem^ thoroughly convincing. It appears that no real controversy
over the wisdom of developing the power project exists, although certain
utilities are concerned about possible methods of distribution of the
power, fearing distribution by public authorities. It is interesting
to note that private companies in the 1920 's were proposing to build
^%bid,, pp. 35 ff.
^''^
Loc . cit, (Hearings)
5Qloc . cit,
^^Ibid., p, 271 J PP.29U ff.
^°Ibid,, p. 60
6llbid
., p, 29.
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the seaway and make a gift of it to the American and Canadian governments
in exchange for the rights to all the waterpower resources of the
upper St. Lawrence River,
The main disagreement with regard to this phase of the project
stems from the federal-state accord under which the United States plans
to sell the title to the tremendous navigation -wGyrks to New York State.
As early as 1932, when the United States Senate was deliberating upon the
treaty of that year, designed to effectuate the St, Lawrence seaway
project, members of the Power Authority of New York State instituted nego-
tiations with the federal government for the purpose of reaching a deter-
mination of the manner in which the developed power was to be distributed.
This resulted in the introduction of a joint resolution which came to
be known as the Federal Government-New York State Accord. The resolution
passed the House, but with the failure of the treaty of-.thic oort to obtain
ratification in the Senate, it was not brought to a vote in that body. It
has been considered, however, ever since, as embodying the federal govern-
ment's attitude with respect to the power question. ^
Section 5 of the Barkley Resolution authorizes and directs the
President to negotiate an arrangement with the government of the State of
New York relevant to transferring the power facilities on the United States
side of the International Rapids section to the State of New York. The
repeated public utterances of the state legislature, the governor and other
public officials of New York State to the effect that the people of New
Senate Report 810
,
op . cit.
, p. U7.
63 Hearings
,
og. cit. , p. 380,
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York claim inalienable ovmership of the power resources of the St. Law-
rence River, together with various legal interpretations of the New York
State Power Authority Act of 1931 have served to raise substantial contro-
versy as to the exact title which New York will enjoy, as to whom it may
sell povrer, what the costs of this power are to be, as to the control of
rates, and as to the available market for power. Some states -ydthin the
300 mile radius of practical power distribution seem concerned lest they
receive no benefit from this part of the project, a benefit to which they
believe they are entitled, since it is essentially a federal project.
Indeed, there is substantial evidence in the hearings to indicate that
New York State's Power Authority is without authority to sell the power
for use beyond the boundaries of Nev/ York State. This reasoning runs as
follows: The New York State Power Authority Act provides that all pov/er
under control of the state is to be developed in the interest of New York
State citizens and that such power is to be sold at cost. If sold at cost
out of the state, hoTfever, no benefits could accrue to the people of New
York State, and therefore, according to this interpretation, it woiild
not be in the people's interest to sell out of state at cost. The Power
Authority, by the terms of the act v^hich created it, could not legally
sell any St. Lawrence power to other states under this view.^^
This whole controversy takes on the appearance of a moot question
for the proponents point to the safeguards written into Article 5 of the
Barkley Resolution and neither side can prove its point conclusively.
The entire controversy over the seaway project, including both
navigational and h3rdroelectric poiver aspects, is a perilous one to
approach as an objective observer. Perhaps the most definite observa-
Ibid
. , p. 390.
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tion which can be made after a careful consideration of the hearings and
subcommittee reports on the Barkley Resolution is that the legislators
who participated in committee activity with regard to the resolution
seemed to have their minds made up on the merits and weaknesses of the
project before the hearings were completed. It is at once a naive and
significant observation, for it reveals much about the nature of the
American legislative process and the American layman's reaction thereto.
The inability to agree even on basic and simple facts bespeaks the com-
plexity of the problem and the depth of feeling involved on both sides;
it further indicates a weakness in the legislative approach to tech-
nical matters. Logic would dictate a more straightforward and direct
approach to technical and legalistic matters, a greater insistence upon
objective qualifications for "experts", a greater respect for true
expertise. And common sense would recommend a greater regard for brief
and relevant testimony in place of rambling emotionalism and longwLnded
repetition.

CHAPTER IV
THE EIGHTIETH CONGRESS
AND THE ST. LAWRENCE SEAWAY PROJECT
On February 27, 19hS} the President pro tempore of the United
States Senate directed the clerk of that body to call the roll for the
purpose of determining the existence of a ouorum, Follovdng this deter-
mination, a rollcall vote was taken on the motion of Senator Smith of New
Jersey to recommit Senate Joint Resolution 111 to the Committee on
Foreign Relations; the vote was taken in due course, and the motion was
carried by a vote of $7 to 30.2 ^^ils orderly manner, without fireworks
or frenzy, and by a margin of twenty-seven votes, the proposed St. Lawrence
Seaway project went down to its third defeat in fourteen years.
To the casual spectator it seemed, perhaps, not a very resoiinding
defeat. The opponents had not sought a blunt "aye "-and-"nay" showdown
to kill the resolution outright. Indeed, Senator Smith, author of the
motion for recommital, had been himself a member of the subcommittee
which had held hearings on the seaway project (the subject of Senate Joint
Resolution ^fl 111), and he had concurred in the subcommittee's majority
report recommending a favorable report to the Senate on the measure
(although concurring without prejudice as to his vote on final determination
^Legislative day of Monday, February 2, 19li8.
^The Congressional Record (Washington, D.C.: United States Govern-
ment Printing Office), 9U:37:1921, Friday, February 27, 19U8 (unbound).
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of the issue. )^ Upon presenting his motion in the Senate chamber he went
to considerable lengths to explain his attitude on the seaway resolution
and his reasons for proposing recommittal. He said, "Considering this
project as a whole, I feel it is an inevitable development sometime in
the future," and he went on to confess that "it seems that the Secretary
of the Army should be directed to make a further and more complete report
on the whole project,"^ He then outlined several points which such a report
should include and v/as careful to emphasize that his doubts about the
seaway stemmed solely from the confusion of facts and conflicting opinions
presented by different witnesses at the hearings of May and June, 19U7»^
Nevertheless, Senator Wiley of Wisconsin, who had handled the measure
throughsporadic rounds of debate since January 26, later said
It was one way of killing the bill.... a political way. A vote
for recommittal can be 'explained' to any group of constituents.
But I know when I've been licked....We won't try to get the bill
out for another try this year.
7
The resolution which was recommitted on February 2? had been
introduced on May 9 of the preceding year by Senator Vandenburg, on
behalf of fifteen other senators and himself. The main purpose of the
resolution was to authorize on a self-supporting and self-liq\iidating
basis the St. Lawrence seaway and power project, as provided for in the
agreement of 19Ul between the United States and Canada. If passed, it
'^Majority Report of a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations on S. J. Res. Ill, Senate Report 810 , 80th Congress,
2nd Sess. (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office,
19U8), p. 22
^The Congressional Record
,
op
.
cit., 9U:33:l^$5i Monday, February 23,
19U8 (unbound)
6lbid., P. 15^5
"^G.P. Trussell, article in ^he New York Times
,
February 28, 19U8
p. 1.
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would have had the effect of authorizing the President to construct the
United States share of the St. Lawrence project, as provided by the
Canadian-American Agreement, subject to certain specified conditions;
these conditions included the approval of the Canadian Parliament, the
agreement of the Canadian government to the principle of self-liquidation
of the deep-water navigation works, and the elimination from approval
of two full articles and a part of a third contained in the 19Ul execu-
tive agreement.
Q
The resolution also authorized and directed the President to
negotiate with Canada a new agreement during the period of construction
of the St. Lawrence seaway, to define and establish the necessary toll
charges to make the new deep-water navigation facilities self-liquidating,
and it provided certain policies to be folloYred in the negotiation of
these details with Canada,^ In addition, it authorized the President to
negotiate an agreement with the government of the State of New York for
the transfer of the power facilities included in the seaway project to an
appropriate State agency under a formula agreed to by New York State and
the United States Corps of Engineers. -^^ However, except for the addition
of the all-important provi.sions relating to the self-liquidation of the
project by means of tolls on shipping, the resolution closely resembled
Senate Joint Resolution lOU of the Seventy-ninth Congress. Since exhaus-
tive hearings had been held on the latter resolution, covering practically
every phase of the project except self-liquidation, the present subconmdttee
^"Analysis of the Resolution", in Sen, Report 810, o£. cit., pp. 5-6
^Ibid
., pp. 6-7
^Ojbid
., p. 7
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confined the hearings of May and June, 19h7, on Senate Joint Resolution 111,
to two basic issues: first, the national defense aspect of the project in
the atomic age, and second, the principle of self-liquidation of the
seaway by tolls on shipping. The hearings on the two resolutions, lOU and
111, thus complement each other and taken together, provide a comprehen-
sive coverage of all the major aspects of the project and the principal
arguments pro and con«
The specific differences between the Barkley Resolution and the
Vandenburg Resolution occur in Sections 1, 3 and k of the two resolutions,
which are otherwise identical. Section 1 of the Vandenburg Resolution
carries the provision:
That the President, before said agreement enters into force, obtains
satisfactory assurances, by exchange of notes or otherwise, that the
Government of Canada agrees to the principle of making the rBw deep
water navigation works on the Saint Lawrence River herein authorized
self-liquidating by charging reasonable tolls, this principle to be
implemented through the conclusion of arrangements satisfactory to
both governments pursuant to section 3 of this joint resolution.
H
Section 3 reads as follows:
(a) During the period of construction the President is authorized
and directed to negotiate a further agreement with the Government of
Canada, under the provisions of the Boundary Vfeters Treaty of 1909,
defining the rates of charges or tolls to be levied for the use of
the new deep-water navigation facilities on the St, Lawrence River,
authorized in this resolution: Provided , That (l) the total charges
shall be fair and eoTiitable and shall give due consideration to
encouragement of increased utilization of the navigation facilities,
and to the special character of bulk agricultural, mineral and other
raw materials J (2) that tolls shall vary for ships in ballast and
according to the character of cargo with the view that each classifi-
cation of cargo will so far as practicable derive relative benefits
from the use of these facilities; (3) that in no event shall the total
charges exceed the equivalent of $1.25 per short ton of laden cargo,
and may be less, depending upon character of cargo; (U) that tolls
shall apply only on traffic utilizing the new deep-water navigation
works on the St, Lawrence River, with such exception of local or way
"Provisions of Resolution", ibid,, p. 3
4i
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or government traffic as may be agreed upon by the two countries:
Provided further , that such agreement shall become effective only
after approval by the Congress of the United States and the
Parliament of Canada.
(b) The President may, at his discretion, appoint a St. Law-
rence Advisory Commission, to cooperate with similar representatives
of the Government of Canada, for the purpose of studying and, after
public hearings, making recommendations to their respective govern-
ments on the administrative, technical and economic aspects of a toll
system on the proposed twenty-seven-foot Saint Lawrence canals, as a
basis for the agreement on tolls proposed in this section.^2
The change in Section h is a slight one and is made in order to
permit the United States Government to meet the cost of negotiations in
conjunction with the new agreement on tolls, Furthermore, two amend-
ments to the Vandenburg Resolution were recommended by the subcommittee
which deliberated upon it; one amendment was designed merely to clarify
the meaning already inherent in the resolution but clouded by inaccurate
wording, namely, the reference in Section 1 to "the St. Lawrence River"
where it is clear that the words "Great Lakes-St. Lawrence system" were
intended. In the words of the subcommittee majority report
Self-liquidation should of course cover not only new deep-water
navigation works on the river but also connecting channels on the
Lakes... and the deepening of the Welland Canal... 1^
The other amendment suggested by the subcommittee would provide
for the collection of passenger tolls, as well as tolls on cargo; the
subcommittee felt that the passenger toll should not exceed the equiva-
lent of $1.50 per passenger .^^
The question of the degree to which the St. Lawrence project would
12
"Provisions of Resolution", loc . cit.
1^ Loc, cit .
•'^"Recommendations of the Subcommittee", ibid. p. 22
cit.

59
contribute to the national defense occupies many pages of the hearings
on Senate Joint Resolution 111 and brings to the fore several personali-
ties closely associated in an official capacity -with our military estab-
lishments. Proponents of the project as a contribution to national
defense include President Truman, vrho, in a message to Congress of
October 3, 19U5j likened the St. Lawrence project to those American rivers
whose "timely development. .shortened the war by many years, and saved
countless American lives"5-^^ former President Hoover, who referred in his
testimony at the hearings to the difficulties of transportation in the
recent war and pointed out that those difficulties still exist; the
late President Roosevelt, vho recommended the authorization of the St.
Lawrence project on national security grouds on June 5j 19Ul by saying,
"«•• I know of no single project of this nature more important to this
country's future in peace or war";l^ General George C. Marshall, who.
as Secretary of State, testified at length before the subcommittee; the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose favorable view was based upon three factors,
namely, the desireability of possessing additional shipbiiilding and ship-
repair facilities, the value of an additional line of communication, and the
need for a new large source of cheap, dependable power; 19 the Permanent
"''Message of President Truman to the Congress of the United States,
quoted in ibid,, p. 8,
'^
Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate , 80th Congress , 1st Sess., on S.J. Res . lllTWashington,
D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, i9li7), p. 20
1 ft
Message of President Roosevelt to the Congress of the United
States, quoted in Sen
.
Report 810
,
op . cit. p. 22
19
Letter of February 16, 19U6, from the Secretary of War to the
Secretary of State, transmitting the vievrs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
reprinted in Hearings
,
op
.
cit
., p. lU
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Joint Board on Defense, United States-Canada, which went on record as
favoring the early completion of the project since it would "directly
contribute to the security of the North American continent"; 20
Kenneth C, Royall, than Under Secretary of the Arnry, who presented at the
hearings the official view of the War Department.
Secretary Marshall, testifying before the subcommittee on May 28,
19k7f maintained that there are four advantages in the St, Lawrence project
21from the point of view of the national defense. First, the project would
make possible the construction and repair of ocean-going vessels in the
relatively secure area of the Great Lakes, Vessels comparable to the
Liberty Ships utilized in the last war could navigate the twenty-seven-
foot channels of the improved waterway; the limitation of the waterway
to ships of twenty-five foot draft would exclude only about 20 per cent of
existing ocean-going ships. In the second place, the seaway would provide
a vital new line of communication in the heart of the industrial area of
the United States and Canada which could also serve as a reserve route in
the event that other routes should be crippled. In addition, the project
would create a tremendous source of power in an area which has no power
development comparable to the TVA, the Colmbia and the Colorado River
projects. Finally, the seaway would contribute materially to the over-
all economic and industrial life of the United States, which in turn is
the strength of the nation.
Under Secretary Royall stated the War Department's position on the
matter as follows: " the St, Lawrence seaway is not vital to national
20Statement approved by the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, United
States-Canada, in ibid
, , p, 1^.
2%earings
,
ibid ,, pp, 12-18
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defense, but the project would be helpful to national defense. "22
-jhig
qualified endorsement provides the key to Mr. Royall's testimony, which
is considerably less positive and emphatic than Mr» Marshall's, Ihile
reiterating the four advantages which Mr. Marshall named, Mr. Royall
modified them some-vrtiat by sajdng that neither a lack of electric power
nor transportational delays in the last war can be said to have adversely
affected the conduct of the war or its timing; he went on to say:
At the present time the shipbuilding facilities — and I am
speaking of facilities for larger ships which are not now
constructed in the interior — on our coasts seem adequate,
more than adeauate, really, for construction of the necessary
commercial ships, as well as the really necessary warships; and
there is nothing to indicate that this condition will change for
many peacetime years. 23
Mth regard to the broad economic benefits which would redound to
the advantage of the entire country, Mr, Royall pointed out the importance
' of dispersion of industry as a protective measure in case of war; while
the seaway project would probably tend to relieve the industrial conges-
tion along the Atlantic seaboard, there is already such a large amo\mt of
industry now in the Great Lakes region that that very region may require
decentralization. In this connection he said:
It is, therefore, difficult to say with any definite assurance
whether from the standpoint of industrial vulnerability this project
would be advantageous or disadvantageous. I am inclined to believe
that it would have more advantages than disadvantages, largely because
it may have the effect of spreading industry more uniformly through-
out the entire Great Lakes region. 2U
^^Ibid., p. 15U
^^Ibid,, p, 1^6
^Wd., p, 1^5
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Mr. Royall further stated that the locks and canals, although
vulnerable to attack in time of war, could be safely defended, and he
denied that construction of the seaway would facilitate invasion of the
country. Not only did he believe an invasion from the sea unlikely, in
view of CMC superior naval power, but he maintained that should an invasion
seem imminent, the locks and other installations could be easily destroyed.'
By reiterating the contention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, mentioned in
the preceding chapter, that the power plants, locks and canals could
readily be rendered unusable in the event such action became necessary,
Mr. Royall leaves himself open to the same criticism as that levelled by
the opponents at the Joint Chiefs of Staff; obviously, we cannot assume
that we alone can readily render this project unusable. Mr. Royall did
cite a disadvantage resulting from the need for defending the seaway,
namely, that such defense would require an added and substantial defense
commitment in terms of men and money and equipment.
The conclusion of the subcommittee members responsible for the
majority report favoring the seaway project on grounds of national defense
is based upon the following points: (l) The St. Lawrence project, as a
medium of transportation and an abundant supply of power, would enhance
the war potential of the United States j (2) the locks and poTrer house of
the St. Lawrence project are no more vulnerable than many important instal-
lations in the northern third of the North American continent; (3) the
resources required for the construction of the seaway, in manpower and
materials, though substantial, will not create any serious drain upon our
national capacity; (U) the economic health of the middle western region
Ibid., p. 1^6
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is a vital component of national defense, and the seaway project will
enhance that economic health j (^) lack of adequate reserves of power in
New York State and the Province of Ontario, where actual power shortages
developed during World War II, would obviously vreaken the security of the
United States and Canada.
The opponents of the seaway project presented a barrage of arguments
designed to invalidate the proponents' contentions about the value of the
project for national defense. Citing Under 3ecretai*y Royall's statement
about the adequate shipbuilding facilities now in existence, they deplored
the folly of augmenting such proved facilities with building and repaar
stations located in an area where "one bomb, placed at a critical point
in the project, could bottle them [ships built in the Great Lakes area]
up completely - perhaps for the rest of the war,"^*^ Moreover, they believed
that presently existing facilities in the Great Lakes area could be used
many times over for building eoually necessary smaller ships which can
be uaed Lu navigate the existing fourteen-foot channels, 28 ^ expanded
Great Lakes shipbuilding industry, it is maintained, could be created
only by stripping the existing shipyards of work and personnel; and the
seasonal factor raises the Question, vj-ould it be judicious to place
reliance on shipbuilding facilities which will admittedly be icebound
for four to five months of the year?
Furthermore, the reference by Secretary Marshall to the relative
security of the Great Lakes area opens an interesting field of debate; the
traditional idea that, in vartime, inland areas are more secure than those
2^Sen. Report 810, 0£. cit., pp. 10-11
' Hearings, op
.
cit., p. 21^.
Loc. Cit.
rr
6k
on the coast is challenged by two distinguished witnesses, Vice Admiid.
Russel Willson (Retired) and Major General Follett Bradley, United States
Army (Retired). It is the thesis of Admiral Willson, who served during
the war as Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander in Chief to Admiral King
and as a naval adviser to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that attacks on the
United States must come from the air and that under such attack the Great
Lakes area is no more secure than the rest of the northern third of the
United States and is less secure than the southerntwo-thirds. 29 General
Bradley, who was in command of the First Air Force during the war and
IBhose job it was to organize the air defense of coastwise shipping on the
east coast, puts the point even more stronglyj he stated that
The St. Lawrence seaway and power project now lies in the most
exposed and vulnerable part of continental United States except Alaska.
For that reason, the arguments advanced in 19Ul to the effect that
completion of this project would materially aid the national defense
are less applicable now than then...
It is now conceded by all thinking people that the greatest threat
to the continental United States will be attacks through the air over
the north polar regions, with the dense concentration of industry in
the northeastern and Great Lakes area of the United States as the
primary target.30
Decentralization of industry would dictate a different approach
than the St. Lawrence project suggests, in the view of these two gentle-
men; in General Bradley's words
To augment national security, it appears that if additional facilities
are to be built, they should be dispersed toward the South and West
and withdrawn from rather than imposed upon this already advanced and
congested industrial area, 3-'-
2%earings , loc. cit .
^°Ibid., p. 22U
^"^Loc. cit.
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The arg:uraents advanced against the value of new shipbiiilding and
repair facilities located in the Great Lakes area also are pertinent to
the use of the seaway as an additional line of coiraminication and as a
possible reserve route in time of war,. The case against the seaway based
upon reasons of vulnerability to attack operates to mitigate the claimed
effectiveness of the seaway as a line of communication for ocean shipping.
But such vulnerability is only one of the limitations of the seaway in
this respect. The closure of the seaway by ice for k-^ to 5 months of the
year operates, certainly, to its detriment; and the possibilities of inter-
ruption of service by accident or sabotage are manifold, according to
Admiral Willson, In his view, the mechanics of a canal lock are such that
it is particularly vulnerable to disarrangement by sabotage from ashore
or from the ships traversing it; he admits that he himself once narrowly
escaped wrecking the Gatun locks in the Panama Canal because of a jammed
throttle valve in the engine room of his destroyer.^
^
There is another factor which has a bearing on the value of the
waterway; in the case of emergency, would ships be used to parallel land
transportation? Admiral Willson is inclined to think that the wartime
traffic on the waterway would be reduced because the ships would have to
be employed elsey^iere,-^-^ And, finally, to what extent may the seaway be
expected to ease the wartime strain on the port facilities of the east
and Gulf coasts? On the basis of 10,000,000 new tons of annual United
States traffic (5,000,000 tons each way) estimated in the St. Lawrence
Survey of 19Ul by the Department of Commerce, the easing of strain would
Ibid
., p. 215
Ibid
., p. 216
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be only about 2^ per cent, since the east and Gulf coast ports handle over
200,000,000 tons a year, and since war freight shipping would be predom-
inantly one way.^^ As to easing the strain during wartime on rail trans-
portation, the easement which the waterway could have furnished during the
period 19U1-19UU, if it had been completed before that time, would have
been less than 1 per cent, since the railroads during those years originated
an annual average of 1,U05,000,000 tons.^^ The extent to which the water-
way could serve as a reserve route is, of course, limited by these same
percentages. Itlihile the Department of Commerce holds that its I9I4I estimates
were highly conservative and presented at the hearings higher estimates
of annual tonnage v^-hich would use the seaway, the opponents are not unjusti-
fied in using as a working basis the figures presented in 19l|l, the last
year that a comprehensive study of the seaway and its probablje traffic
was undertaken.
It is significant to note that, apart from general remarks as to the
difficulty of defending dams and powerhouses. General Bradley makes no
mention of the power aspects of the seaway project; and Admiral Willson
admits that "this question of power is a technical matter which I shall
leave to those better qualified. "36 He offers only one argument question-
ing the wisdom of developing the International Rapids power potential,
and it is a weak one: if the proposed power plants do develop cheap power,
this would tend to replace plants which are more expensive to operate, and
when war comes we might be in a dangerous position of "having most of our
[earings , loc . cit.
Loc. cit.
36.
Loc, cit.
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power eggs in that area in one basket. "37 The importance of cheap and
plentiful hydroelectric power to a nation at war and the feasibility of
developing just such power in the International Rapids section of the
St, Lawrence River are not seriously Questioned by the opponents; indeed,
the minority report of the subcommittee reads, in part, as follows:
We believe that a serious weakness in the majority's position on
this point lies in their failure to make it clear that it may be
wholly possible to construct, if necessary, the power project without
also constructing the navigation facilities contemplated in the seaway
project...
On the isolated question of whether the power dam can be justified
on the basis that the national defense will be thereby benefitted,
we express no opinion... What evidence there is simply emphasizes the
necessity for conducting a thorough investigation into the power subject,
divorced from any consideration of the navigation phases of the St.
Lawrence project.^'^
The most telling argument against the seaway as an aid to national
defense is the assertion of the opponents, particularly General Bradley,
that the project cannot be defended against enemy air attack.39 This
belief is in opposition to the statement of Secretary Royall, speaking on
behalf of the ViTar Department, which was quoted earlier in this chapter;
the interested reader can only choose between the authorities on record,
for a decision one wav or the other reou.i.res knov;ledge and experience beyond
the capacity of the average citizen to summon up. This disagreement
strikes at the core of the whole problem of evaluating the seaway in
terms of national defense; it is a concrete example of the clash of experts
and the resultant dilemma <33! the interested bystander. General Bradley
Ibid
., p. 217
Minority Report of a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations on S. J. Res^. Ill, Senate Report 810 , Part 2 , 80th
Congress, 2nd Sess. (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing
Office, 19U8), p. 1$.
39Hearings
,
op
. cit.
, p. 22^.
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contends that
The part of the St. Lawrence waterway now in operation, notably
the Sault Ste, Marie and the Welland Canal, is not defensible against
determined air attack. Its defense would not be strengthened by the
proposed additions...
The Sault Ste. Marie and Welland Canals, and to a lesser degree,
the Detroit and St. Clair Rivers are very attractive targets for air
attack. Each of the UO locks is a sensitive point, and each must be
defended separately, except in those few cases where two or more are
within a mile or two of each other.
The real question is : Can the project, with its UO locks, more or
less, and its proposed dams and powerhouses be defended against enemy
air attack? I answer categorically 'no'. ^'^
To reinforce his views. General Bradley cites examples of dams,
locks and power plants in Europe wrecked most effectively by Allied
bombing during the war and specifically relates the details of the bombing
of the fiuhr dams;^ against his forceful presentation and obvious qualifica-
tions, the reader must set the experience, knowledge and position of leader-
ship of the Under Secretary of the Army and of the entire War Department,
for which the Under Secretary spoke at the hearings. It is a dilerana
of major proportions.
An overall view of the defense aspects of the St. Lawrence seaway
project and a perusal of the arguments thereon may well lead an interested
citizen to the follovdng conclusions: the proponents speak largely in
generalities, which must be evaluated in terms of the character, experience
and positions of leadership of the men who present the generalities, T^iiile
the opponents have specific and devastating arguments which stand up
effectively alone and which are more susceptible to the deductive process
as practiced by the layman. It remains true that we must choose between
conflicting authorities if we would reach a definite conviction, but the
^°Ibid., pp. 22U-225
^Hearings, loc. cit.
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internal logic of the arg\iments can be deduced to at least a limited
extent. The words of the Under Secretary of the Army can be given due
weight at the same time that a .judgment is made on his testimony as a
whole, namely, that it is lukewarm and lacking in positive emDhasis.
Sumilarly, the arguments of the opponents may be given close attention
at the same time that we face the indisputable fact that the opposition
holds a position psychPlogically more tenable. It is invariably easier
to attack than to defend, to criticize and tear down than to prove a posi-
tive assertion. Those who, in the interests of accuracy. Qualify their
assertions, almost always play into the hands of their critics.
The point of view of the opponents on the national defense issue
properly should reach full fniition in convictions about the seaway as a
whole only when the seaway is seen clearly in all its ramification;
defense aspects may well prove to be a variable, changing in scope and
nature depending upon the conception of the project as a v^hole. In this
sense, national defense aspects of the seaway cannot be arbitrarily divorced
from other aspects of the project. Probable wartime benefits of the
project to the nation must be carefully weighted against the probable
difficulties of defending the project against attack. Worded another way,
the problem of defending the seaway is essentially a negative problem,
for which seaway benefits in time of war are a positive compensation; and
seaway benefits in wartime cannot be predicted unless the seaway is
evaluated in terms of normal peace-time benefits. For example, the large
defense commitment necessary to defend the seaway, mentioned by Secretary
Royall and seized upon by the opponents as another lever to use against
the seaway, would become entirely secondary if the seaway were to produce
/
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sizeable, positive benefits to the nationj requirements of cost, effort and
manpower to defend it would be willingly met, and problems of defense
wotuLd be attacked \v±th ingenuity and vigor. Above all, a sense of pro-
portion must be maintained in evaluating the arguments pro and con.
The question of self-liquidation of the new deep-water works of
the seaway by means of tolls levied on traffic poses a legion of problems,
resulting from widely differing estimates of possible and probable traffic
which could and would utilize the seawav, varying estimates of seaway
cost, a variety of accounting methods (any one of which could appropriately
be used), and general doubts about the wisdom of collecting tolls on the
Great-Lakes-St. Lawrence waterway system. General Marshall makes it clear
at the beginning of the hearings that the Department of State supports
the principle of self-liq\iidation; he further reports that the matter of
tolls has been discussed with Csuaaciian government officials, and that
The Canadian Government is prepared to agree to the principle of
making the St, Lawrence seaway self-liquidating by means of toll
charges, subject, however, to the conclusion of arrangements sat-
isfactory to both governments for the implementation of this
principle.
The charging of tolls on the canals of the St. Lawrence is also
sanctioned by the last clause of Article I of the Boundary Waters Treaty
of 1909 between the United States and Canada, which reads:
Either of the High Contracting Parties may adopt rules and
regulations governing the use of such canals -wdthin its ovm territory
an^may charge tolls for the use thereof, but all such niles and
regulations ai^all tolls charged shall apply alike to the subjects
or citizens of^igh Contracting Parties and the ships, vessels, and
boats of both of the High Contracting Parties, and they shall be
placed on terms of equality in the use thereof .'^^
^^ibid., pp. 12-13
^^United States-Canadian Boundary Y/aters Treaty of 1909, quoted
in Sen. Report 8lO, op. cit., p. 12.
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Thus Section 3 of the Vandenburg Resolution appears to be
founded upon a legal instrument which is the supreme law of the land and
to which the Ciovernment of Canada is a party. However, Itr, Gilbert R.
Johnson, general counsel of the Lake Carriers Association of Cleveland,
Ohio, maintained at the hearings that the proposed agreement on tolls could
not be related to the 1909 Treaty, first, because that Treaty has definite
geographical limitations which Section 3 of the resolution in -^uestion
overlooks, and second, because ^ the 1909 Treaty is not a springboard for
special agreements on every subject. - a point debated in previous
hearings and discussed at some length in Chapter III. He further main-
tained that the agreement respecting tolls would be v/holly invalid unless
it was subsequently ratified by the Senate according to the treaty clause
of the Constitution.^^
The very principle of tolls was assailed by L. C. Sabin of the
same association, who presented the view that a toll system on the St.
Lawrence would run counter to the long established policy of the United
States providing free use of navigation facilities.^^ On the other hand,
Mr. J. H. Parmelee, Vice President of the Association of American Rail-
roads, strongly endorsed the self-liouidation principle (although opposing
the seaway project per se), saying that
The railroads have taken the position for many years that water-
way improvements should be made self-liquidating, and have said that
if that were done the railroads would not oppose any sound improve-
ment project. There has been no change in their position.
^Hearings
,
op . cit
. , pp. 16^-166
^^Ibid
., p. 167
^^Ibid., p. 178
hi.
'ibid., p. 19^7
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The basic economic motivations of two different occupational
groups are clearly revealed by these divergent positions. Mr, Parmelee
went on to examine matters preliminary to establishing a toll schedule and
expressed a fear that the Canadian Parliament and the United States Congress
might not be able to reach an agreement on details,^8 Finally, Senator
Leverett Saltonstall of Massachusetts posed the question: should not the
toll system be worked out in detail and agreement with Canada reached
thereon before construction of the project, rather than during construction,
as the Vandenburg Resolution provides?
Apart from the wisdom and legality of tolls and of the specific
provisions relating to the impoation of tolls in the Vandenburg Resolution,
the problem of self-liquidation is a highly complicated and delicate one.
This complexity was admitted by the senators who concurred in the minority
report of the investigating subcommittee when they said in their report
... one need only read the testimony on this point to appreciate
its present hopelessly confused and self-contradictory nature. No
two sources, whether public or private, appear to be in agreement...
A complete and thorough investigation of the project from the
self-liouidation point of view by an informed and interested agency
....might establish an authoritative basis upon which an intelligent
decision could be predicated.
Wide disagreement over self-liquidation is apparent throughout
the hearings, for the proponents contradict each other almost as much as
they contradict the opponents. No less than nine self-liquidation plans
are outlined in the hearings, four being offered by the proponents in an
^^Ibid., p. 199
^9ibid., p. 170
^°Sen. Report 810 , Part 2, 0£, cit ., p. 20.
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effort to show the validity of self-liquidation^l and five being
offered by the opponents who attempt to disprove the contention that
the seaway can be made to pay for itself .^^ Disagreement among the
proponents is most marked in the testimony of Dr. N, R. Danielian, ^3
who criticized the amortization technique advocated by the Corps of
Engineers. Actually, the problem of self-liquidation is a blend of
three basic questions: (1) the construction cost of the project; (2) the
volume of traffic that ^'.i.11 utilize the seaway; and (3) the question
whether the anticipated traffic volume will produce sufficient revenue
from tolls to cover annual maintenance and operating costs, together v^ith
amortization and carrying charges^ on the original investment. On all
three phases the record indicates widespread disagreement.
The third question above in itself involves complications, for there
is some question as to the wisdom or necessity of amortization. The Army
Engineers' plan calls for a U.33 per cent interest and amortization charge
annually; 55 Dr. Danielian, as mentioned previously, contests this feature,
pointing out that the Panama Canal does not provide for the retirement of
the original investment and that private companies do not usually retire
Hearings
,
op . cit . : Testimony of Henry La Liberte, pp. lU8 ff.j
General R. A. Wheeler, pp. 385 ff.; Secretary of Commerce William A.
Harriman, pp. 398 ff.; Dr. N, R. Danielian, pp. I4I8 ff,
^^Hearings , ibid . : Testimony of L. C. Sabin, pp. 17U ff.; J. H.
Parmelee, pp. 196 ff .; Henry Foley, pp. 22? ff .; Chauncey J. Hamlin,
pp. 2h7 ff.; and Walter Hedden, pp. 293 ff.
Hearings
,
ibid., pp. U2U-U2^
%bid
., p. 388
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Loc. cit.

7k
the original investment,^^ Purthermore , the amount which would be re-
quired annually to pay for maintenance and operation is in doubt; the
Amrjr Engineers choose an arbitrary figure, the reason for which is
nowhere given, while the Port Authority of New York seems to feel that
an arbitrary percentage of the investment ( h per cent ) would be
required.
From the morass of conflicting facts and figures, two definite
self-liquidation plans may be cited for purposes of analysis and compar-
ison. The self-liquidation plan incorporated in the majority report of
the subcommittee favoring the seaway project^^ j^g based upon estimates
of cost and traffic furnished in the main by the Army Engineers and the
Department of Commerce. Lt. General Wheeler of the Army Engineers sub-
mitted a table showing the total cost of the St, Lawrence seaway and
power project, and the cost to complete the project based on May, 19U7
price levels; however, this table showed all Canadian costs (lArith the
exception of those in the International Rapids section) at 19Ul lev^lQs,
and the subcommittee added per cent to put them upon a basis uniform
with the American costs. The resulting figures are contained in Table I,
which appears on the next page.
It will be noted from Table I that the total cost of the seaway
and power project including expenditures to date is estimated at
^^Ibid., p. U2U
^"^Ibid., p. 388
^^Sen. Report 8lO, Part 2, 0£. cit., p. 22.
^^Sen. Report 810
,
o£. cit., pp. 12-17
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TABLE I
ESTIMATED COST OF ST. LAWRENCE SEAWAY AND POWER PROJECT
AT MAY 19U7 PRICES
(Taken from Senate Report 810, 80th Congress,
2nd Session, p. lU)
• • • • •
Canada-'
Great Lakes section:
New lock at Sault Ste, Marie
with approaching channels ...
Connecting channels
Welland Canal 133,592,000
St, Lawrence River:
Thousand Islands section
Internation Rapids section
A. Works solely for navigation.
B. Works solely for power 6ii, 571,000
C. Works common to navigation.,
& power 3U,U73,000
Canadian section:
St, Francis Lake channel........
Soiaanges Reach 39,657,000
Lachine Reach 85,880,000
United^
States
lU, 63 7, 000
92,591,000
Total
$ lU, 63 7, 000
92,591,000
133,592,000
772,000 1,283,000 2,055,000
66,079,000
166,18U,000
66,079,000
230,755,000
182,577,000 217,050,000
2,0U6,000
Total ;$360,991,000
Expenditures to date 132,672,000
Cost to complete 228,319,000
$523,351,000
31,7U2,000
li91,609,000
2,OU6,000
39,657,000
85,880,000
$88U,3U2,000
l6ii,iaU,000
719,928,000
Basic figures from testimony of Lt. Gen. R. A. Viheeler, Chief
of Engineers, U, S, Army, and increased in the case of new work, except
for the International Rapids section, by 53.8 per cent to adjust to
May 19U7 cost levels.
2
Figures from testimony of Lt. Gen, R. A. Wheeler, Chief of
Engineers, U. S, Army.
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$88U,000,000, of which the Canadian cost is $361,000,000 and the United
States cost $^23,000,000. The cost to complete the project is $720,000,000,
of which the Canadian cost is approximately $230,000,000 and the United
States cost $U90,000,000. The cost to complete the project — namely,
$720,000,000 — is the figure adopted by the subcommittee as the starting
point for determining the amount to be liquidated. The resolution pro-
vides for the self-liquidation of new work and the subcommittee considers
that it excludes from si.f-liquidation the cost of work done in the past.
The next step is to determine the proper sillocation of total cost
between the power phase and the deep-water navigation facilities, since self-
liquidation applies only to the latter. Accordingly, the actual payments
by the State of New York to the United States Grovernment under the accord
referred to in Section ^ of the resolution, and the payments by the Province
of Ontario to the Dominion Government under the Dominion-Provincial Accord
of March 19, 19Ul for the power facilities must be taken as the total cost
of the power project, while the remaining cost is out-of-pocket contribu-
tions by the Federal Grovernments of Canada and the United States to be
,
,
_i
-Tohifc X^uJhicV^^U^^S^^^ CDS'
liquidated by charges against navigation.jj^^ii^^^'^'kiiriuai' charges^re'^m.reci'^
to make these costs self-liquidating.
According to Table II, the first cost of new work to be liauidated
by toll charges on navigation is about $398,000,000, of which the United
States share is $330,000,000 and Canada's share $68,000,000. Adding
interest during construction at the rate used by the Army Engineers
(3 per cent for one-half of the assiamed construction period of six years),
the net investment in remaining new work would be slightly more than
rr
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TABLE II
ESTIMTfiD COST OF NEIV WORK ANn MMJAL CHARGES TO BE LTQUIT)ATED BY TOLLS ON NAVIGATION
(Taken from Senate Report 810
, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 1^)
Canada United States Total
First cost:
Total cost of new works $228,319,000 |ii91,609,000 $719,928,000
Payment by New York State for power ^ 160,79^,000 160,795,000
Payment by Ontario for power ^ 160,795,000 160,795,000
First cost of remMning new work to be
liquidated by toll charges on navigation 67,52li,000 330,8l]4,000 398,338,000
Interest during construction:
At 3 percent for 3 years^ 6,077,000 29,773,000 35,850,000
At 2\ percent for 3 years 5,06U,000 2^,811,000 29,875,000
Net investment in remaining new work to be
liquidated by toll charges on navigation:
At interest during construction of 3 ^ 73,601,000 360,587,000 U3U,l88,000
At interest during construction of 7^% 72,587,000 355,625,000 U28, 213,000
Annual charges on remaining net investment:
I. On $U3U,188,000 at ii.33 percent interest
and amortization:
Interest & amortization of U.33 percent 3,187,000 15,613,000 l8, 800,000
Maintenance and operation 1,230,000 1,230,000 ' 2,1460,000
Total i;,U17,000 16/8U3,000 21,260,000
II. On $U28, 213,000 at interest of 2.5
percent and sinking fund of 1 percent
and 2,5 percent compound interest:
Interest (2.5 percent) I,8l5,000 8,891,000 10,706,000
Sinlcing fund at 1 percent (compomnd
interest at 2.5 percent) 726,000 3,556,000 U, 282,000
Maintenance and operation 1,230,000 1,230,000 2,U60,000
Total 3,771,000 13,677,000 17,UUO,000
Calculated in accordance with the terms of the Fedecal-State accord referred to in sec.
5 of the resolution.
The Oominion-Provincial Accord of Mar. 19, 19Ul, provided for a specific sum of money to
be paid by Ontario for the power facilities, but this sum was not used in the table be-
cause it was based on 19Ul cost estimtes. The figure used in the table is based on the
assumption that Canadian allocations for power w^ll be comparable to those of New York
State, inasmuch as the power facilities on both sides of tlie river are identical.
One half of the period of construction of 6 years, on the assumption that the expenditures
during the 6 years will be at a uniform rate.
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toU,000,000 (United States, |360,000,OOOj Canada, $7h,000,000) . Using
the interest rate of 2^ per cent, which is closer to the rate (2.06 per
cent) at which, according to the subcomrnittee, the United States Govem-
ment borrows money today, tho total net investment would be about
$U28, 000,000 (United States, $355,000,000; Canada, $73,000,000).
The Amry Engineers advocate an interest and amortization rate of
U.33 per cent, which would bring total annual charges (including mainten-
ance and operations) to about $21,260,000 (United States, $l6,8hO,000;
Canada, $U,U20,000) . At this rate the total investment would be entirely
retired in hO years, and in the opinion of the subcommittee proponents,
this is probably too short a period in view of the permanent nature of the
works. ^"^ On the other hand, if we take $U28,000,000 as the net investment
applying an interest rate of 2^ per cent and using a sinking fund of 1 per
cent and 2-| per cent compound interest (which the proponents feel is more
typical of the practice in private industry than straight-line amorti-
zation^2)^
-tjig total annual charges (including maintenance and operation)
would be $17,h50,000 (United States, $13,680,000; Canada, 13,770,000). Under
these conditions, the total investment would be retired in approximately
53 years.
It is interesting to note that the subcommittee proponents feel
the annual charges in both the above cases to be overstated; in their own
words
... the estimates of first cost take no account of the very real
possibility that construction costs may decline during the next
several years. In addition, it should be noted that Canadian 19Ul
^^Ibid., p. 15.
^-'•Ibid
., p. 16.
^^Sen. Report 8lO, loc. cit.
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construction costs have bsen increased by the same percentage
($3.ci per cent) as United States costs in calculating the current
cost of the seaway, whereas in fact Canadian construction costs
appear to have risen not more than 30 per cent. Moreover, in esti-
mating annual charges against navigation, the combined interest and
amortization rates have been applied to the entire investment, some of
which will be in depreciable items such as lock machinery but much
of which will be in nondepreciable items such as land and the dredging
of connecting channels. Apart from the fact that it is not customary
in private industry to amortize the investment in nondepreciable
items, the Federal Government itself has not yet, after 33 years
of operation, applied this principle to the Panama Canal, Insead,
in the case of the Panama Canal, annual credits are made to a
depreciation reserve for the purpose of replacement of depreciable
property, °^
To summarize the beliefs of the subcommittee majority favoring
the seaway on a self-liquidating basis we may again revert to their
The committee is cognizant of the fact that there are several
alternative financial and accounting policies that may be adopted
ill bringing about a sound administration of this project on a
self-liquidating basis. There are choices to be made in the matter of
interest rates, in the matter of amortization policy (whether straight
or sinking f\ind bjgisis or a depreciation policy), and in the period
over which the retirement of investment should be effectuated.,.. The
exact details. .. .must be settled through negotiation and agreement
with the Canadians. The important thing is that the available
alternatives. .result in an annual cost of some iS, to 21 million
dollars, any one of which would be a sound policy,"^
The senators responsible for the minority report opposing the
seaway take quite a different approach to the self-liquidation problem.
Their self-liquidation plan is concerned only with the United States
costs, and although they are willing to accept General VJheeler's cost
estimates for the purpose of lurking out a schedule of liquidation,
they doubt the accuracy of those estimates. Pointing out similar
public projects whose actual costs far exceeded their estimated costs,
they maintain that:
report
:
63Sen
. Report 810, loc . cit .
Ibid
., pp. 16-17.6h-
65Senate Report 810
, Part 2, op . cit., d. 22
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...there is every reason to believe that the costs of the project
might well be considerably in excess of $3^0,000,000 jOeneral
l/yheeler's figure for first cost to the United States excluding the
amount already expended by this country and deducting the amount
representing New York State's proposed payment for the power project,
but adding interest during construction of 2h per cent^ If we
take into account the difficult and diverse engineering problems
involved in the St. Lawrence project and the histroy of other naviga-
tional projects, there is every reason to believe that actual costs
will vastly exceed present estimates.""
Assuming $3^0,000,000 as representing a conservative initial cost
figure, the opponents go on to work out recurring costs. Interest at 3
per cent on $3^0,000,000, assuming amortization of the loan over a ^0-
year period, is about $5,^00,000 a year; a 3 per cent allowance for opera-
tion and maintenance amounts to $10,^00,000; depreciation of 1 per cent
annually equals $3,^00,000. This brings the annual cost of the seaway's
navigation project to around $20,000,000 for the United States alone. ^7
Some comment on this self-liquidation plan is unavoidable. Although
amortization is assumed over a ^0-year period, no amortization pa3mients are
called for in the plan, unless the 1 per cent depreciation charge can be
interpreted as applying to amortization. Technically, depreciation means
the annual charging off as an expense of a specified sum of money, and
assets decrease accordingly. If the term is used accurately by the oppon-
ents here, the assets of the navigation works (the original investment) will
be halved at the end of fifty years. It is questionable whether this tech-
nique makes sense applied to a public enterprise of this type. If, on the
other hand, depreciation is intended by the opponents to mean a sort of
sinking-fund arrangement, then at the end of fifty years only half of the
^^Senate Report QlO^^c cit%
^"^Ibid., pp. 22-23
c
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original investment will have been liquidated by the sinking fund. In
either case, the sinking-fund arrangement suggested by the proponents
would seem a sounder method to utilize.
Apart from the difference in accounting methods displayed by the
three self-liquidating schemes just described, there is another important
difference between the proponents' pbus and the opponents' plan: namely,
the wide variance between estimates of annual allowance for maintenance and
operation. The proponents estimate this annual charge to the United
States at 1^1,230,000; the opponents estimate it at $10,^00,000; hence,
there is a difference of over $9,000,000 involved in the estimates of this
one itemi The difference between the lower of the proponents' two estimates
of total annual American cost and the opponents' estimate of total
annual American cost ($13,677,000 and $20,000,000, respectively) is about
$6,^00,000; obviously, the most important discrepancy to be accounted for
lies in the difference between estimates of the one item of maintenance
and operation. As mentioned earlier, neither side presents any reasons
or breakdowns to substantiate its estimate of this item; here, again,
the interested observer who lacks the technical skill to discover for
choose
himself the proper annual charge for this item must ' sirbitrarily between
authorities. If it is asking too much of the individual citizen that he
discover for himself the proper annual charge for maintenance and operation
of the seaway's navigation works, it is also asking a great deal to expect
him to choose arbitrarily between Qualified authorities; if a technical,
factual matter of this kind cannot be established Tdthout major disagree-
ment, then there can be little hope for agreement on the more speculative
aspects of the St, Lawrence project.
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The Question of annual tonnage on the new deep-water works, tolls
on which would provide the funds for self-liquidation, is one of the more
speculative aspects of the project. To quote from the minority report of
the subcommittee opposing the seaway:
We assume as a working basis the 2^,000,000 tons of potential
traffic annually the estimate of total traffic capacity contained
in the St. Lawrence Survey undertaken by the Department of Commerce
in 191^13.... The St» Lawrence Survey indicates that the proposed
27-foot channel would add annually some 16,000,000 tons of traffic
to the 9,000,000 tons now carried between the Great Lakes and Montreal.
The s\irvey assumes that 10,000,000 of these additional 16,000,000
tons will be of American freight; that is, freight consigned to or
from American ports but not necessarily carried in American bottoms.
Of these 10,000,000 tons, the survey assumes 6,000,000 will be domestic
and U, 000,000 -vidll be export-import traffic....
The American costs will have to be borne by the 10,000,000 tons of
new American traffic if the project is to be self-liquidating.^"
It is the contention of these senators that, considering the
financial difficulties long encountered by American coastwise and inter-
coastal lines, it is highly improbably that domestic traffic could bear
the burden of any tolls at all; as they see it, the toll burden must fall,
exclusively or in the main, on export-import traffic — the U, 000, 000 tons
a ye^r estimated by the St. Lawrence Survey
. On the basis of total
American annual costs for self-liquidation of $20,000,000 a toll of $^ per
ton wo\ild be required; and such a toll is four times the maximum of $1.2^
per ton permitted by Section 3 of Senate Joint Resolution 111. Even
assuming that all of the 10,000,000 tons of estimated new American traffic
is to be export-import and therefore able to pay tolls, an average toll of
$2 would be required, which is still in excess of the Si. 2^ maximum
pennissible. And finally, even if Section 3 were amended to permit higher
tolls, a toll sufficient to make the seaway self-liquidating would be
Ibid., p. 23
Ibid
., p. 2k
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either prohibitive or would result in absorption of the tolls through
Government subsidy, thus rendering the imposition of tolls even more of
an illusion.'''^
The proponents offered at the hearings much more cheerful news
from the point of view of self-liquidation possibilities. Secretary of
Commerce Harriraan testified that preliminary studies undertaken by the
Department of Commerce indicate that under optimum conditons, total
American and Canadian potential traffic on the St. Lawrence seaway would
range from 38,000,000 to ^2,000,000 tons annually, 71 As to the actual
capacity of the seaway. General Wheeler testified that if the average
cargo per vessel were in excess of 3>800 tons, which was the limiting
factor in the 19Ul estimates, the capacity of the seaway would rise accord-
ingly, The Secretary of Commerce further testified that analysis of the
assumptions underlying the earlier estimate of capacity in relation to
recent preliminary traffic studies by the Department of Commerce indicated
that the theoretical capacity of the project might be as high as 100,000,000
tons and that the actual capacity is likely to be in excess of U0,000,000
tons.'^3 Table III on the next page, prepared by the Department of Commerce^ 7U
and included in the majority report of the subcommittee, 7^ indicates the
toll revenues which may be expected, based upon these traffic estimates.
'''^Ibid., p. 2^
Hearings
,
op
,
cit ,, p, hOh
"^^Ibid., p. 392
'^^Ibid,, p, 399
%bid ,, p, UOU
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TABLE III
ESTIMATED TOLL REVENUE FROM POTENTIAL TRAFFIC ON SEAMY
UNDER OPTIMUM CONDITIONS
(Taken from Senate Report 810, 80th Congress,
2nd Session, p. 20)
Short tons Total toll revenue
dollars
per ton
General cargo 6,000,000-10,000,000 ^ 1.2^ ^ 7,^00,000-12,^00,000
Grain 5,000,000 .2^-.50 1,2^0,000- 2,^00,000
Coal ^,000,000 .2^-.^0 1,000,000- 2,000,000
Petroleum & gasoline... ^1,000,000 ,2$-,^0 2^0,000- ^00,000
Wood pulp, pulpwood &
newsprint'. 1,000,000 .2$-.$0 2^0,000- 500,000
Manganese, chrome &
bauxite ores 1,000,000 .25-.50 2^0,000- 500,000
Iron Ore ^ 20,000,000-30,000,000 .25-.50 5,000,000-15,000,000
PetroleumJ
Total 38,000,000-52,000,000 15, 500,000-33,500,000
Movement in ballast.... (2) ,10-,l5 2,000,000- 3,000,000
Grand Total 17,500,000-36,500,000
Short range
20,000,000 dead-weight tons if fully loaded.
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The Table assumes that 25 to 50 cents per ton would be charged on bulk
cargoes and |l,25 per ton on general cargo of comparatively high value.
The subcommittee members favoring the seaway concluded, therefore,
that it is feasible and practical to make the St. Lawrence seaway self-
liq\iidating, even at the high construction costs prevailing today. Their
estimates and figures are persuasive, but in viewing them it is well to
remember the qualifications made by Secretary Harriman and General
llheeler at the time that they put their statements into the record.
Secretary Harriman said:
The Department f^of Commerce3 has not yet made a detailed analysis
of potential traffic on the seaway in the light of these revised
capacity estimates. Moreover, the Department has been able to make
only very preliminary judgments concerning the effect of tolls on
traffic which might use the waterway and the level of tolls v<rhich can
be imposed, %• subsequent comments on traffic which might use the
seaway must accordingly be considered only as very rough estimates
rather than conclusions resulting from careful study. These limitations
should be kept clearly in mind in appraising the estimates which are
included in the table as an appendix to my statement \'_Table III^.'"
Equal significance should be attached to these remarks by General
Vftieeler
:
I am fully satisfied with the accuracy of the estimated costs
of the work proposed, since those costs were developed after detailed
study and field investigation of the International Rapids develop-
ment prepared by the Corps of Engineers in 19U0 to 19U2 based upon
known cost indices, making it possible to bring the estimates up to
date at any given time, I am not in the possession of similar exhaus-
tive information dealing with the traffic that may make use of the
waterway. Before the Corps of Engineers could render a definite finding
as to whether the new deep-water navigation works on the St, Lawrence
River could be made to 'pay out' by the imnosition of tolls, it would
be necessary to make a thorough study of all prospective traffic, the
character and amount of tonnage that would actually move under a toll
system in conformity with certain assumed principles and toll rates
such as those set forth in section 3 (a) of Senate Joint Resolution III
and the actual net income from those tolls as compared with the assessed
Hearings
,
op. cit.
, p, UOO,
I
86
navigation costs. Such a study by the Corps of Engineers would
appear to require definite authorization by the Congress and would
take more than a year to complete.'''?
Considering the careful nature of these qualifications, the
opposing senators cannot be strongly condemned for writing in the minority
report that
..•no reasonably responsible businessman would undertake a
project a fractionthe size of the St, Lawrence seaway on the basis
of estimates which^Swi^been tendered with the express, cautious
qualifications as those tendered by the Department of Commerce and
the Corps of Engineers
Regardless of where one's sympathies lie on this matter, it is
difficult if not impossible, from a logical standpoint, to be certain
beyond a reasonable doubt of either the possibility or impossibility of
self-liquidation; there are too many intangibles, too many imponderables,
"too many unknowns. Perhaps the writers of the minority report pose the
essential problem most accurately -when they say:
... we do not believe that the differences can be resolved or the
complete answer found during six short days of hearings and brief
report. The whole problem of self-liquidation is extraordinarily
complex; the significant factors entering therein ajB highly technical
and almost unbelievably limitless in scope and variety. To resolve
them all into an authoritative and reasonably final finding demands
the skill and judgment of experts. ?9
Vlhatever our legally elected representatives in Congress may have
pretended to be, individually and collectively, over the years, they have
seldom if ever laid claim to "the skill and judgment of experts " on matters
"highly technical."
Ibid
., pp. 389-390
'Sen. Report 8lO
,
Part 2, op . cit. , p. 21
Ibid
., pp. 2^-26
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CONCLUSION
Consideration of the St. Lawrence seaway project by the Senate in the
80th Congress was not limited to consideration of merely those features
which distinguished the Vandenburg Resolution from the Barkley Resolution
of the previous Congress. The hearings on the Vandenburg Resolution
complemented those held on the Barkley Resolution^ proof of their essential
inseparability lies in the fact that the official printing of the majority
report favoring the Vandenburg Resolution contained a reprint of the
majority report favoring the Barkley Resolution of the 79th Congress.^
Similarly, the minority reports opposing the two resolutions were printed
together, 2 for the edification of the Senators who were to vote upon the
Vandenburg Resolution. Thus the vote which recommitted the Vandenburg
Resolution to the Committee on Foreign Relations was, in effect, a vote
against two resolutions (the Barkley Resolution, it will be recalled, died
without a vote being taken on the Senate floor )^ — a vote negating the
majority reports of two different Senate subcommittees and a resoiinding
denial of the seaway project's validity. As much a victory for the
opponents as if the bill had been killed outright, the tactic of recommittal
served, however, to focus attention upon the essential core of the problem
inherent in the seaway controversy,
'Majority Report of a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations on S, J, Res. Ill, Senate Report 810, Both Congress
2nd Sess. (vVashington, jD.C, : United States Government Printing Office, 19U8)
2jfi.nority Report of a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations on S, J. Res. Ill, Senate Report 8lO, Part 2, 80th
Congress, 2nd Session (Yifashington, D.C: United States Government Printing
Office, 19U8)
^See Chapter III, pp. 12-13
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Walter Lippman has written:
The cleverest and most industrious representative cannot hope to
understand a fraction of the bills on which he votes... I have known
Congressmen, when they were boning up on a subject, to study as
they had not studied since they passed their final examination^,...
They had to dig for information., which in any consciously organized
government should have been easily available in a form suitable for
decision,^
On the basis of the case study of the St. Lawrence seaway project
herein developed, we may well speculate upon the possibility that recom-
mittal of the Vandenburg Resolution represented a Senatorial protest against
the herculean task of digging for information I'rhich should have been avail-
able in a form suitable for decision . While the record of the hearings on
the seaway project totals 1986 pa^es of detailed arguments, opinion, facts
and psuedo-facts, that record hardly can be described as information arranged
and developed in a form suitable for decision. As we have seen, the detailed
arguments frequently contradict one another, the opinions presented are
often so charged with emotionalism that their value is questionable, the
facts and psuedo-facts are intermingled in such a way that it is sometimes
difficult to distinguish between them. Furthermore, the relevance of facts
admittedly true is immensely difficult to determine; one interesting ex-
ample of this csin be seen in the argument offered against the seaway that
90 per cent of the total American shipping tonnage could not, fully loaded,
navigate the 27-foot seaway.^ This percentage is based upon tables prepared
by the United States Maritime Commission^ and on this account may be consider-
ed beyond dispute. On its fac^ this argument, based upon facts admittedly
Nvalter Lippman, Public Opinion (New York: Harcourt. Brace and
Company, 1922), p. 291.
^The Congressional Record (Washington, D.C.: United States Govern-
ment Printing Office, 19U8),9a:33 :15U9, Monday, February 23, 19U8 (unbound),
^c. Cit.
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true, is a very telling one; would it, indeed, be wise to build a seaway
of a depth which could accommodate only about ten per cent of American
merchant vessels? But the relevance of the facts derived 9fAi;f from the
tables of the United States Maritime Commission can be determined only
when one knows more about merchsuit vessels and how they are loaded. If
we substitute common sense for accurate information, we will insist that it
is not practical to send ships out not fully loaded; Senator Lodge of Massa-
chusetts made this very point when he argued against the feasibility of the
seaway at a round-table discussion on the radio program, "America's Town
Meeting of the Air. "7 gut when we learn that the preponderance of vessels
transiting the Panama Canal normally have been vessels loaded only to two-
o
thirds of capacity, the picture changes. Perhaps it will change again
if we take the time to analyze the traffic going through the Panama Canal
and discover the reason for loading vessels only to two-thirds of capacity.
The point is that we must see each fact through all its ramifications; we
must test the relevance of each argument before accepting it, or our con-
victions will be built on weak and shaky fooindations
.
It can truly be said that the highest capacities for deductive
reasoning possessed by attentive Senators of the 80th Congress were sorely
tried by the confused, complex and contradictory testimony contained in the
hearings on the seaway resolution. On almost no point in the entire contro-
versy were the facts established beyond a reasonable doubt of their authenti-
city; indeed, in some cases, different factions presented totally different
"America's Town Meeting of the Air," broadcast by stations of the
American Broadcasting Company, February 2U, 19U8; the oral discussion re-
printed in f\ill in Town Meeting , bulletin of "America's Town Meeting of the
Air" (New York: The Town Hall, Inc., 19U8), 13:14i:l5
8see Chapter III, page k9.
rc
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sets of facts for incl"usion in the record. The disagreement over basic
facts manifest in the testimony of opposing ivitnesses in re the traffic
capacity of the proposed seaway and potential savings on cargoes shipped
via the seaway is most notorious; the strong disagreement on these two
points alone justifies honest doubt about the validity of the project as
a whole.
Furthermore, detailed and presumably objective studies undertaken by
government agencies, such as the St. Lawrence Survey undertaken in 19Ul by
the Department of Commerce, were contradicted and repudiated by mtness after
witness at the hearings, raising important questions of a delicate nature
and suggesting the basic conflict between the practice of free and open
policy making on the one hand, and the criterion of expertise on the other.
The term "expert" is subject to much use, misuse and abuse during the course
of the hearings, and this is perhaps the greatest single factor contributing
to the confusion of the record. While paying lip service to the concept of
expertise, Americans have generally made little conscious effort to define
and clarify it, at least in the realm of government; basically, the American
attitude toward expertise in government is one of doubt and suspicion.
Recognizing that the technicalities of the seaway project made the services
of experts mandatory if a decision was to be made, our legislators in this
instance compromised by recognizing every self-styled expert who volunteered
to be of service; thus, the practice of free and open policy making was
continued at the same time that expertise was presumably given its opportun-
ity to contribute. The inevitable result of this so-called compromise can
be seen, in all its tragic-comic aspects, in the hearings of 19U6 and 19U7
on the St. Lawrence seaway project.
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Actually, the organization of the hearings itself leaves much to
be desired. Since the project is a two-fold one, involving both navigation
improvement and the construction of power-producing facilities, and since
the hearings embrace all aspects of the project without any logical organi-
zation except for a clear-cut differentiation between self-styled opponents
and proponents, the arguments on all points are intermingled freely in the
record. The customary procedure in conducting hearings before legislative
subcommittees was followed in this case: a specified number of days were set
aside for the hearings, the time being equally divided between the opponents
and proponents, A total of fifteen days was devoted to the hearings on
Senate Joint Resolution lOU, one day less than the sixteen days originally
anticipated j proponents as a group and opponents as a group were each given
five days for direct testimony, with the remaining five days divided eoually
between the two groups for purposes of rebuttal,^ Similarly, hearings on
Senate Joint Resolution 111 took up six days, with two days allotted to each
side for direct testimony and one day allotted to each side for rebuttal.
The fairness of this arrangement cannot be criticized, but the confusion
resulting from this basic arrangement is shocking; longwinded repetition
and rambling emotionalism characterize the hearings, and important arguments
are frequently submerged or completely lost in the shuffle. An arg\iment
broached by the proponents on, say, page kO or ^0 of the printed hearings
may not be answered by the opponents until several days later, and several
hundred pages farther on in the printed record. No amount of indexing of
the printed hearings can atone for this fault, and it is almost frightening
to think what valuable facts may have been lost upon subcommittee members
whose absense was frequently made necessary by other committee responsibilities
^Sen, Report 8lO, op, cit., p, 37
"^^Ibid,, p. U,
f
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and whose crowded calendars may have made possible only a perfunctory perusi.
of the printed hearings. Indeed, the time element itself posed a serious
problem; a total of twenty-one days of hearings on both resolutions is
short indeed when the complexity of the problem to be resolved is considered.
The dilemma of the earnest and reasonably objective Senator is com-
pounded in the case of the interested citizen desirous of forming a "public
opinion" of his own on the subject of the seawayj his access to the facts
is even more limited than that of the Senator, Mere discussion and argu-
ment guarantee us no knowledge of the facts, and they can lead us astray;
the example of Senator Lodge's argument on the town meeting radio program,
cited above^ illustrates just how misleading the deductive process can be,
when all the facts are not presented as a basis for discussion and argument.
Furthermore, the problem of determining the relevance of facts admittedly
true is no easier, and perhaps is more difficult, for the average citizen
than for the average lawmaker. Time, again, is of the essence; if the busy
legislator cannot devote as much of that precious commodity to the task at
hand as he might like, how much more formidable this problem of time must
be to the average citizen, busy with all the humdrum concerns of day-to-day
living!
Finally, the importance of prejudice and emotionalism must be
faced. Both sectional and economic factors play a part in the pattern of
thought on the seaway project, and the interested citizen must contend not
only with the facts of the matter, confused and incomplete and irrelevant
as they may often be, but also vdth the less tangible factors of his own
emotions, outlook and environment, A study of the hearings reveals that the
proponents of the project are predominantly from certain areas: the Midwest,
particularly the great wheat-producing areas, and certain lake cities, like
r!
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Detroit and Milwaukee, whose leaders apparently believe that those d. ties
stand to prosper by a completed St. Lawrence seaway, Similarly, the oppon-
ents are predominantly from certain areas: established port cities like
New York and Boston, and certain lake cities, like Buffalo, i'/hose leaders
apparently believe that their cities will suffer if the seaway becomes an
accomplished fact,-^'^ Furthermore, in certain sections of the country situated
many miles away from the Great LaJces-St, Lawrence area, there is little or
no manifestation of interest in the project, even though it is not unreason-
able to believe that a workable and successful St. Lawrence seaway project
might well affect the economy of the entire nation, 1/ilhile the basic motivation
is undoubtedly economic, geography plays its part in influencing the thinking
of proponents and opponents: a native of Mew J-ork Gi-Hyy will view the pro-
ject in a different li^ht from a native of Buffalo, and both will approach
it differently from a native of San Francisco or Seattle,
The role which lobbies aDd pressure groups played at the public
hearings on the two resolutions should not be overlooked or underestimated.
For example, during the six days of hearings on Senate Joint Resolution 111,
a total of 55 witnesses gave testimony} -^-^ of these 55, 7 were officials,
either active or retired, of the United States Government and appeared in an
official or advisory capacity, vdthout representing any private organization
or company; one was a retired Army officer and one was a retired Navy
officer, both appearing on behalf of a lobbying organization;-^^ l5 testified
"^"
Slearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations
,
United States Senate, 80th Congress, 1st Sess., on S,J. Res. Ill
,
(Washington,
D.C: United States Government Printing Office, 19U7) pp.llU,122,131, l59.
l^ibid., pp. 268, 310, 353
13
Ibid,, pp. iii-iv
^Wd., pp. 12, 19, 26, 15U, 385, 398, Ul2
"^id,, pp. 213, 233.
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as representatives in some official capacity of a state, a city or a port
authority established by 'interstate compact;-^^ 3 were Senators or Represen-
tatives appearing, presumably, on behalf of their constituents: and 28
witnesses represented either a private company or corporation, or a lobby-
ing organization, or several such organizations. This does not mean U»
fao-^ that 28 different private companies, corporations and lobbying organi-
zations were represented at the hearings, for some groups were represented
by more than one witness; conversely, some witnesses appeared on behalf of
more than one organization.
It is interesting to note that some of the official state ag^i^cies
which were represented by witnesses at the hearings are themselves little
more than lobbies. The Michigan Great Lakes Tidewater Commission, for
example (represented at the hearings by Frank C. Barnes) is a statutory
body created by act of the state legislature and devoted to the stated pur-
pose of promoting the establishment of deep-water connections between the
Great Lakes and the Atlantic Ocean. -^^ Similarly, the Wisconsin Deep Water-
ways Commission, represented at the hearings by Herman E. Ekern, was created
by the Wisconsin legislature to promote a deep waterway from the Great Lakes
through the St, Lawrence River to the ocean, It is also interesting to
note that a brief opposing the seaway and signed by the Corporation Counsel
of the City of Buffalo was filed at the hearings on behalf of that city; 20
this poses the provocative Question, has a city government the right to speak
^^Ibid ,, pp, U3, 80, 122, 131, lUii, l6l, 2h7, 260, 262, 281, 293, 3^3,
3^9, 3677Tr7.
-^"^Ibid,, pp. 167, 182, 309
^^Ibid ,, p. 81.
^^Ibid., p, Ihh
^°Ibid,, p, 353
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for its population on the virtues or faults of a proposed national policy?
The rise of lobbies and pressure groups has been heralded as a signal
development in American politics, and such groups have been the object of
much study, analysis and thought, as well as the target of much criticism,
both deserved and undeserved. Their general lack of responsibility has
been atti*ibuted to two chief factors: the undefined scope of lobby member-
ship and the usually unclear delegation of authority by the membership to
it legislative agents. The registration of lobbyi^sts in the national capital
has been undertaken in an effort to spotlight such groups and publicize their
activities; the full result of this measure remains to be seen. While a study
of pressure groups per se lies outside the scope of this paper, it is not
unfair to conclude from our analysis of the hearings that important and power-
ful pressure pre jeo 'fc groups were busily at work on behalf of and in opposi-
tion to the project at hand, and that their work often served to confuse as
well as to clarify the pertinent issues.
The device of the public hearing, despite its shortcomings and
deficiencies, is not outmoded or foolishj it does not deserve to be thrown
into the discard. All interested parties, under our system of law, are
entitled to be heard; in the field of judicial administration this is known
as giving to all interested parties their "day in court" and constitutes
the essence of the doctrine of due process. As W, F. Willoughby has pointed
out, "Observance of this principle is desirable both as a matter of abstract
justice and as a means of securing the information needed for intelligent
action, "21 The point to be made here is merely that the public hearing,
even when it embraces the testimony of government officials and so-called
^•^Director 's Preface by ?7, F. Yvilloughby to Group Representation
Before Congress by E, Pendleton Herring (Institute for Governmental Research
of the Brookings Institution. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1929) p. i.
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experts, is not enough . It must be augmented by other devices for the
securing of vital information on which to predicate intelligent action.
Similarly, the "town meeting" type of discussion and exchange should be
retained but augmented by other methods of stimulating and developing an
informed public opinion.
The value of the empirical approach is great, but that approach is
one to -vrtiich, in the complicated wurld of today, we dare not aspire; all the
elements of modern life conspire against it. We live in an age of special-
ization, and we had best capitalize upon it. The controversy over the St,
Lawrence seaway project teaches a precious lesson: there can be no substitute,
under present-day conditions, for really expert knowledge and interpretation
of the facts. The complexity of modern life has led to the compartmentali-
zation of knowledge and that, in turn, requires adjustments in the organiza-
tion of government. We must find a way to cope effectively with the vast
environment that is beyond the reach of the average citizen and the average
lawmaker, without destroying the vital structure which makes possible the
translation of public opinion into public policy. Our freedom to make and
implement value judgments must not be impaired, but the blind spots in our
vision must be corrected.
The answer to our problem may lie, as Walter Lippman suggests, 22 in
intelligence sections attached to the various departments of government,
devoted to making the unseen facts intelligible to those who have to make
the decisions — or we may seek the remedy elsewhere. In any case, the
fact remains that^we are -ablo to maintain a free government in the twentieth
century, we must somehow develop a vigorous concept of expertise and a work-
able, dependable, democratically-controlled system of fact-finding and
fact-interpretation, in order that public opinion may result in valid
social judgments and political action may culminate in sound public policy.
22
Lippman, op. cit., p, 386
<<
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With ihe proposed imppovements,
covering a distance of 258 miles, navi-
gation will be opened for ocean vessels
over a distance of 2, 687 miles on the
Great LoKes and the St Lawr»ence
totbe Atlaatic Ocean.
Of thetotal mileage ofthe seaway, 90.4 per
cent is now complete and 9.6 per cent
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(90.4 percent)
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17
3 I
28
International Rapids Section, St Lawrence River 46
Soulan^es Section, St. Lawrence River le
Lachinc Rapids Section, St. Lawrence River 13
Total Incomplete 2S8
(9.6 per cent)
* The Welland Canal was completed by Canada in 1932 at a cost of «I32,000,000 but re<(ulres
dredging from present depth of 25 feet to 27 feet.
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